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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Multiple Information Sources
and Equilibrium in Financial Markets
by
Elyashiv David Wiedman
Doctor of Philosophy in Management
University of California, Los Angeles, 2020
Professor Brett Michael Trueman, Chair
The purpose of the dissertation is to examine the interaction among multiple infor-
mation sources in financial markets such as among analysts and firm managers and the
effect of these interactions on the information available in financial markets.
In the first chapter, analysts of heterogeneous abilities may choose which firm to
cover, firms with or without prior coverage, and then issue earnings forecasts. The
information an analyst observes depends on his ability and may be correlated with
that of other analysts who cover the same firm. It is shown that analysts with career
concerns, i.e., who aim to appear well informed, may differ in their coverage decisions.
Thus, analyst initiations of coverage provide information about analysts’ abilities. Also,
depending on the correlation of analysts’ information and the prevalence of competent
analysts, analysts’ reputations are not necessarily monotonic in forecast accuracy, in
contrast to the prevalent assumption in the empirical literature. Further, incompetent
analysts bias their forecast if their information is not sufficiently precise. It is shown
that forecasting bias is more likely when a few analysts cover the same firm than when
ii
an analyst initiates exclusive firm coverage.
In the second chapter, the interaction between analysts and firms’ managers is
examined. A firm’s manager may be regarding future demand and may disclose it at
his discretion. An analyst who covers the firm’s industry observes relevant information
and issues a (possibly biased) forecast. Whether the analyst issues a biased or unbiased
forecast is unknown to investors, who price the firm based on the available information.
It is shown that investors’ beliefs about the manager’s information endowment and the
analyst’s forecasting objective are endogenously intertwined. Thus, in addition to the
direct role of the analyst’s forecast in providing information, the forecast has an indirect
effect by influencing investors’ beliefs regarding the manager’s information endowment.
If the analyst’s forecast comes after the manager’s possible disclosure, it is shown that
analyst coverage crowds out the manager’s disclosure compared to the case without
coverage. If the analyst’s forecast precedes the manager’s disclosure, the manager may
disclose his information even when the analyst issues a positively biased forecast.
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CHAPTER 1
Analyst Initiations of Coverage
1 Introduction
Sell-side analysts play a central role in financial markets through the information they
provide to market participants. However, the information analysts provide varies in
quality because analysts vary in abilities; see, for example, Desai, Liang, and Singh
(2000) and Fang and Yasuda (2014). Thus, it is not surprising that investors, employers,
and academic researchers have invested great efforts to identifying the underlying abil-
ities of analysts. In turn, analysts aim to develop a reputation as being well informed.
Earnings forecasts are a piece of valuable information that produced by analysts, and
thus, are considered a useful source in determining analysts’ reputations, see, for exam-
ple, Jackson (2005). In addition to earnings forecasts, information about the underlying
competency of an analyst may be revealed from other actions that analysts take, such
as the choice of which firms they cover.1 Surprisingly, the information that can be in-
ferred from coverage decisions has been overlooked by previous literature.2 This paper
examines the relationship between analysts’ reputations, their coverage decisions, and
earnings forecasts.
1It is not immediate that analysts have discretion over the firm they cover. In discussions with
experts in the field, it was suggested that at least some analysts have such a choice. Lee and So (2017)
provide empirical evidence that at least some analysts choose the firms they cover. The model allows
for some analysts to choose the firms they cover, while others are endogenously assigned to cover
certain firms.
2One an exception is Lee and So (2017), who study the information arising from excess coverage
of analysts. They focus on the information that can be learned about the firm’s future profitability
and not about the information that arises regarding analysts’ abilities.
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Whether earnings forecast accuracy affects analysts’ abilities to influence market
prices and whether forecast accuracy influences analysts’ reputations are the focus of
many empirical studies. For example, Jackson (2005) shows that accurate forecasts
generate a higher reputation and that highly reputed analysts generate more trade
for their brokerage firms. Brown (2001) demonstrates that past forecast accuracy is
useful in predicting an analyst’s future forecast accuracy. Clement (1999), Makhil et al.
(1999), Hong and Kubik (2003) and Jackson (2005), among many others, analyze how
forecast accuracy affects the development of an analyst career, e.g., the level of prestige
of the brokerage house wherein he is employed or the probability of work termination.3
While some papers found evidence for forecast accuracy positively affecting an analyst’s
career outcome, other studies did not find such a result. Forecast accuracy is the
focus in vast literature because forecasts are observed by investors and researchers and
can be compared to firms’ earnings when announced. However, another observable
action, namely, analysts’ choice of the firms they cover, has been overlooked by most
of the literature, in particular the theoretical research. Lee and So (2017) examine the
information that can be learned about a firm’s future earnings from analysts’ coverage
decisions. In this paper, I raise the question as to whether analysts of heterogeneous
abilities choose to follow firms with or without prior analyst coverage based on their
competency, and in turn, whether analysts’ coverage decision should be used when
determining analysts’ reputations as being well informed.
I study a model where a new analyst, i.e., an analyst with no prior reputation, may
follow only one of the two firms in the market. Firms are identical in their charac-
teristics, and the only difference arises from analysts’ coverage; an established analyst
3In a recent survey of analysts by Brown at el. (2015), only 25% of the surveyed analysts indicated
that forecast accuracy is highly relevant to their compensation. However, in the same survey, more
than half of the analysts noted that they exclude components of GAAP earnings because of their desire
to improve their earnings forecast accuracy. Therefore, it is clear that forecast accuracy is essential
for analysts.
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follows one of the firms. The new analyst can choose whether to follow the same firm as
the established analyst or to cover a firm without prior coverage exclusively. Analysts
observe noisy signals about the future earnings of the firm they follow. The noisiness
of the signals depends on analysts’ types, i.e., their competency, which is only privately
known to the analysts. Investors, who are the clients of the analysts, revise their beliefs
about analysts’ competency based on the information they observe; that is, analysts’
coverage decisions and their forecast accuracy. In contrast to prior literature, I assume
that the signals of competent analysts are conditionally correlated. Thus, if the new an-
alyst follows the same firm as the established one, then the signals they observe may be
correlated. Therefore, an analyst’s reputation, i.e., investors’ beliefs regarding his com-
petency, may also depend on his peer analyst forecast. In Appendix B, I consider the
opposite case, where the signals of incompetent analysts are conditionally correlated;
The results remain qualitatively the same.
I start the analysis in Section III, focusing on the relationship between forecast
accuracy and (ex-post) reputation while muting the analysts’ initiation of coverage
decisions, i.e., assuming that initiation of coverage is exogenously determined. In this
case, the only information available to investors is the firms’ earnings, the new analyst’s
forecast, and the forecast that the established analyst issues for the firm he covers.4
I show that if the new analyst follows the firm with no prior coverage, his reputation
increases in his (absolute) forecast accuracy. This result is in the same spirit as many
empirical papers, e.g., Clement (1999) and Jackson (2005), where proxies used for
analysts’ reputations are positively correlated with their measures of forecast accuracy.
When the new analyst follows the same firm as the established one, investors’ abil-
ities to update their beliefs about his competency improve because of the additional
4In case that both analysts cover the same firm, I assume that they issue their forecasts simul-
taneously. Hence, an analyst does not learn any information about his peer’s forecast, and so, no
observational herding arises.
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information arising from the established analyst’s forecast. I show, perhaps surpris-
ingly, that an analyst’s reputation, i.e., investors’ beliefs about his competency, is not
monotonic in his forecast accuracy if the correlation of information for competent an-
alysts is sufficiently high and the established analyst is likely to be competent.5 The
intuition for the lack of monotonicity is the following: competent analysts are likely
to observe similar information, and thus analysts might be better off when both is-
sue inaccurate forecasts than when one issues a more accurate forecast while his peer
issues an inaccurate one. Correlation between competent analysts’ information may
arise because they have access to the same information before issuing their forecast
or because better-qualified analysts use similar models to determine the firm’s future
earnings. In this paper, the signals’ conditional correlation plays a vital role, in contrast
to the widespread assumption in prior literature of conditionally independent signals,
for example, Trueman (1994). Banerjee (2020) also considers a model where analysts’
signals are conditionally correlated. He shows that when analysts face greater competi-
tion, it may dampen the aggregate information that investors receive. While this study
and Banrjee (2020) both assume that signals are conditionally correlated, I assume
that analysts are of heterogeneous competency and aim to maximize their reputation
while in Banerjee’s paper, homogeneous analysts care about their absolute and relative
accuracy.
In Section IV, I endogenize analysts’ initiation of coverage decisions. Whether an-
alysts have discretion over the firms they cover is an empirical question. In discussions
with experts in the this field, it was suggested that at least some analysts possess such
discretion. Lee and So (2017) provide empirical evidence that initiation of coverage
may depend on an analyst’s private information. Accordingly, I assume that an analyst
may choose the firm he covers with some probability, q. I show that, depending on
5I determine exact conditions for this non-monotonicity to hold.
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the probability that an analyst has coverage discretion, the equilibrium is pooling or a
separating one. When the new analyst has full discretion over the firm he covers, he
decides to follow the same firm as the established analyst, regardless of his type. How-
ever, if analysts have coverage discretion with only some probability (less than one),
initiation of coverage depends on the analysts’ types. Specifically, a competent analyst
chooses to cover the same firm as the established one, while an incompetent analyst
elects to follow the firm without prior coverage, at least with positive probability.6 As
a result, in equilibrium, an analyst who initiates coverage for the same firm as the
established one is more likely to be competent than an analyst who covers the other
firm exclusively. In other words, an analyst’s reputation depends on the firm he covers,
even before considering his forecast accuracy.
It is well established in the literature that analysts sometimes bias their forecasts,
see, for example, Trueman (1994) and Michaely and Womak (1999). In Section V, I
consider the possibility that analysts bias their earnings forecasts. Like Trueman (1994)
and Aharoni et al. (2017), I show that incompetent analysts underweight their private
information and thus bias their forecast toward the firm’s prior expected earnings. I
further demonstrate that, while incompetent analysts bias their forecasts regardless of
the firm they cover, forecasting bias is less likely to occur when the new analyst follows
a firm exclusively. The reason for a more significant bias when covering the same firm
as the established analyst is the correlation of competent analysts’ information. The
new analyst is better off when his forecast is similar to that of the established one.
Therefore, an incompetent analyst has a greater incentive to bias his forecast since he
expects the established analyst’s forecast to be the same as the expected earnings.
6I show that a pure strategy equilibrium does not always exist. In such a case, a mixed strategy
equilibrium exists where incompetent analysts mix between covering each of the firms.
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2 Model
There are two firms in the market, A and B. The firms are ex-ante identical; differences
arise only due to variation between the analysts who follow each firm. Specifically, I
assume that an established analyst, e, follows firm A, while there is no prior coverage of
firm B. A new analyst, n, who enters the market may follow either firm A or firm B. I
start by describing the earnings of a single firm and the information of a single analyst
who covers that firm.7 Therefore, I postpone the use of the firms’ related indices to the
next section.
2.1 The firm’s earnings and the analyst’s information
The earnings of a firm, pi, are uncertain and can take four possible values, pi ∈
{pivh, pimh, piml, pivl}; positive earnings may be very high (pivh) or moderately high (pimh),
while negative earnings take moderately low and very low values, (piml, pivl).8 I assume
that earnings are symmetric around zero so pivh = −pivl and pimh = −piml. The prior
probability of earnings is Pr(pivh) = Pr(pivl) = 1−α
2
and Pr(pimh) = Pr(piml) = α
2
. I
assume that 1
2
≤ α; that is, moderate earnings are (weakly) more likely than extreme
earnings, either positive or negative.9
An analyst who covers the firm privately observes (possibly noisy) information about
the firm’s earnings and issues an earnings forecast. Specifically, the analyst observes
7The basic structure of the model, i.e., the firm’s earnings and analysts’ signals, is similar to that
of Trueman (1994). However, I diverge from his model by assuming that analysts’ information is
conditionally correlated and that analysts may choose the firm they cover.
8The model can be generalized to the case of a continuous state space with a uniform prior. The
results in Sections 3 and 4 remain qualitatively the same; the uniform prior yields honest forecasts
which derive the same results. However, the results of Section 5 regarding biased forecasts cannot be
extended to a model with a continuous state space because there is no equilibrium where analysts bias
their forecasts towards a specific state (or forecast), see Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006).
9The assumption of symmetry around zero is for convenience only and does not affect the results.
The assumption that moderate earnings are more likely than extreme earnings affects analysts fore-
casting bias, which I discuss in Section 5. If we assume that extreme earnings are more likely than
moderate earnings, then a less competent analyst would bias his forecast toward extreme earnings.
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a signal, s ∈ {svh, smh, sml, svl}, about the firm’s earnings. I assume that the analyst
learns for sure whether the firm’s earnings is positive (pivh, pimh), or negative (piml, pivl),
but the signal is noisy with regards to the magnitude of the earnings, e.g., very high or
high. That is,
Pr(sjk|pijk) = p for j ∈ {m, v} and k ∈ {h, l}
Pr(sjk|pij′k) = 1− p for j, j′ ∈ {m, v}, j 6= j′ and k ∈ {h, l}
Pr(sjk|pij′k′) = 0 for j, j′ ∈ {m, v} and k, k′ ∈ {h, l}, k 6= k′
After observing his signal, an analyst updates his expectation about the firm’s
earnings. While the analyst learns that the firm’s earnings is positive or negative, there
is still some uncertainty about the magnitude of the earnings. The updated earnings
probability distribution after observing a signal is then
Pr(pimh|smh) = Pr(piml|sml) = pα
pα + (1− p)(1− α)
Pr(pivh|smh) = Pr(pivl|sml) = (1− p)(1− α)
pα + (1− p)(1− α)
Pr(pivh|svh) = Pr(pivl|svl) = p(1− α)
p(1− α) + (1− p)α
Pr(pimh|svh) = Pr(piml|svl) = (1− p)α
p(1− α) + (1− p)α
(1)
And so, the expected firm’s earnings after observing a signal sjk, k ∈ {h, l}, is given
by
E[pi|svk] = p(1− α)pi
vk + (1− p)αpimk
p(1− α) + (1− p)α
E[pi|smk] = (1− p)(1− α)pi
vk + pαpimk
pα + (1− p)(1− α)
(2)
Because of the symmetry of positive and negative earnings, in the following subsections
I forego the sign index k = h, l, while using only the magnitude index j = m, v.
7
2.2 Analysts’ abilities and correlation of information
Analysts differ in their ability to forecast firms’ earnings accurately, see Desai et al.
(2000) and Fang and Yasuda (2014); a more competent analyst is expected to provide
a more accurate forecast than a less competent one. These differences may arise, for
example, due to analysts’ abilities to acquire firm-relevant and industry-relevant infor-
mation, or their ability to analyze the information they receive. Each analyst is either
competent, which I denote by good, or incompetent, denoted by bad, with the prior
probability Pr(analyst is good) = θ. The accuracy of his signal reflects the ability of
an analyst. That is, a competent analyst observes a better (in a Blackwell sense) signal
than an incompetent one does. Accordingly, I assume that p equals g for competent
analysts, and p equals b for incompetent ones, where 1
2
≤ b < g ≤ 1.
Differences in analysts’ abilities also affect the correlation of their information. For
example, two competent analysts may have some industry-specific knowledge that in-
fluences, in a similar way, the earnings-related information they possess. Accordingly, I
assume that the signals of competent analysts are conditionally correlated.10 Formally,
assuming that two analysts, say 1 and 2, are competent and observe the signals sj1 and
sj
′
2 , j, j
′ ∈ {m, v}, then
Pr(sj1 = s
j
2|pij) = ρg + (1− ρ)g2
Pr(sj1, s
j
2|pij
′
) = ρ(1− g) + (1− ρ)(1− g)2 j 6= j′
Pr(sj1, s
j′
2 |pij) = Pr(sj
′
1 , s
j
2|pij) = (1− ρ)g(1− g) j 6= j′
(3)
The parameter ρ reflects the (conditional) correlation between competent analysts’
signals, where ρ = 1 represents full (conditional) correlation, while ρ = 0 reflects no
correlation. As I discuss in length below, the (conditional) correlation of competent
10I assume that the signal of an incompetent analyst is conditionally independent of that of any
other analyst, competent or incompetent.
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analysts’ information plays a key role in this paper.
An analyst’s ability is an important aspect for investors who use the information
he provides. However, although an analyst is conscious of his own ability, other mar-
ket participants do not know his ability but rather form beliefs about the analyst’s
ability. I assume that analysts are fully aware of their own type. However, analysts’
abilities are privately known, and all the other parties, e.g., investors, initially use the
prior distribution of analysts’ types, Pr(an analyst is good) = θ, and then update their
beliefs about an analyst’s competency using the information they observe. Denote by
θ˜i(Information) = Pr(analyst i is good|Information) the probability that investors
attribute to an analyst being competent given their information.
The initial reputation of the new analyst, θn, and that of the established analyst,
θe, are assumed to be independent, and need not be the same. The reputation of the
established analyst may reflect investors’ beliefs about his competency based on the
information they possess from past activities. The new analyst’s initial reputation may
reflect the prevalence of competent analysts in the brokerage industry.
Past literature demonstrates that investors’ beliefs about an analyst’s ability in-
fluence his compensation; see, for example, Jackson (2005). As in Trueman (1994),
Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006), among many others, I assume that analysts aim to ap-
pear as being well informed, i.e., to maximize investors’ beliefs that they are competent,
θ˜i(Information).
2.3 Analysts’ forecasts and reputations
After observing his signal and updating the expectation about the firm’s earnings, an-
alyst i issues his forecast for the earnings of the firm he follows, fi.
11 Investors use the
11Note that the analyst’s forecast, fi, is not necessarily reflecting his expectation for the firm’s
earnings or the information he observed since the analyst may bias his earnings forecast.
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analyst’s earnings forecast to make better investment decisions, and then, when the
firm’s earnings are announced, investors also use this forecast to update their beliefs
about the analyst’s competency; that is, θ˜i(fi, f−i, pi), where f−i is the forecast of an-
other analyst who follows the same firm, if exists, and pi is the realized earnings of the
firm.
Note that competent and incompetent analysts must use the same set of possible
forecasts in their reports; otherwise, investors will identify an analyst’s competency
from the forecast he issues even before the firm’s earnings announcement takes place.
In other words, it is impossible to differentiate between the different types of analysts
based solely on the forecasts they issue, without any reference to other information.
Remark 1. Let F be the set of forecasts used by competent analysts, then, in equilib-
rium, an incompetent analyst issues only forecast in F .
Nonetheless, as I show below, investors use the forecasts that analysts issue to-
gether with the announced earnings, i.e., forecasts accuracy, to determine analysts’
reputations.
Since analysts observe only two possible signals conditional on the firm’s earnings
and analysts learn for sure whether the firm’s earnings is positive or negative, w.l.o.g.
I restrict attention to the forecasts set F = {f v, fm}.
3 Reputation with exogenous firms coverage
Before examining the initiation-of-coverage decision, I first analyze analysts’ forecasts
and reputations in case the new analyst, n, cannot choose the firm he covers, but rather
is exogenously assigned to cover a firm. I relax this assumption in the next section. I
continue this section without a firm index but specify whether the firm is followed by
one analyst or more. The timeline is as shown in Figure 1.
10
-
1
earnings, pi, are realized
analyst i observes
his type and a signal si
2
analyst i issues
his forecast, fi ∈ F
3
earnings announcement
investors update their
beliefs, θ˜i(fi, f−i, pi)
Figure 1: Earnings forecasts and reputation
After observing his signal, in equilibrium, the analyst chooses the probability with
which he issues each of the possible forecasts based on his expectation of the firm’s
earnings, and, if it exists, the expected forecast of the other analyst who covers the same
firm. After earnings are announced, investors update their beliefs about the analyst’s
competency, i.e., determine his reputation. The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (henceforth ‘equilibrium’).
Definition 1. (equilibrium)
Let ∆ be a probability measure over F .
An equilibrium is a set of forecasting strategies σi, σ−i ∈ ∆ and investors beliefs θ˜i(fi, f−i, pi)
such that:
(i) for any signal si, σi(si) solves
σi ∈ argmax Epi,f−i [θ˜i(fi(σi), f−i(σ−i), pi)|si]
where Pr(pi|si) and Pr(s−i|si) are consistent with Bayes’ rule.
(ii) Investors update their beliefs, θ˜i(fi(σi), f−i(σ−i), pi), using Bayes’ rule, whenever
possible.
(iii) Off-equilibrium beliefs are such that any forecast f ′i /∈ F results in the belief
11
θ˜i(f
′
i , ·) = 0.
I focus on the most informative equilibrium, the equilibrium where investors re-
ceive the most information possible about the firm’s earnings, compared to any other
equilibrium.12
To shed light on differences in analysts’ reputations that arise when covering each
of the two firms, and differences in coverage decisions, I restrict attention, in the next
two sections, to cases where analysts do not bias their forecasts. That is, cases where,
in equilibrium, analysts’ forecasting strategies are one-to-one mapping from signals to
forecasts.13
Assumption 1. α = 1
2
Assumption 1 ensures that, in equilibrium, analysts issue forecasts according to their
signals without any bias; I relax Assumption 1 in Section 5 to analyze the possibility of
forecast bias. It is important to note that the assumption imposes restrictions on the
earnings distribution rather than on the possible forecasts.
In equilibrium, analysts’ forecasts reveal the information they observe, as suggested
in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Honest forecasting equilibrium).
Assume α = 1
2
. In equilibrium analysts issue forecasts according their signals, i.e.,
fi(si) =
 f
v
i if si = s
v
i
fmi if si = s
m
i
Proof: See Appendix.
12That is, given the equilibrium strategy σi, in case that the analyst observes the signal si and
issues the forecast fi then Pr(si|fi(σi)) is maximized compared to any other equilibrium.
13Note that I do not restrict analysts to issue forecasts according to their signals but rather focus
on the case where the prior distribution of the firm’s earnings is such that, in equilibrium, analysts
issue forecasts according to their signals.
12
When the possible states, i.e., firm’s earnings, are equally likely, analysts issue fore-
casts according to their signals. This honest equilibrium arises because analysts’ signals
are informative about the firm’s earnings and, if relevant, about the other analyst’s sig-
nal. By issuing a forecast according to his signal, an analyst maximizes the probability
that his forecast matches the earnings realization and the other analyst’s forecast. Note
that this result is not necessarily true when α 6= 1
2
, i.e., some earnings are a priori more
likely than others. I relax Assumption 1 in Section 5 to discuss this possibility.
Investors observe the forecasts that analysts provide. In equilibrium, analysts is-
sue forecasts according to their signals, and so, investors learn the observed signals.
Nonetheless, investors are uncertain about the signal accuracy, i.e., the analyst’s com-
petency, thus they form beliefs about each analyst’s competency. After the earnings
announcement, investors update these beliefs using the information they possess. Prior
literature focuses on analysts’ forecast accuracy, or forecast error, as a measure for
market beliefs about analysts’ competency. There is mixed evidence regarding the
predictive power of an analyst’s past forecast accuracy on future performance. While
reputation is monotonic in forecast accuracy for an analyst who is the only one to cover
a firm, the next proposition suggests it is not necessarily the case when a few analysts
cover the same firm.
Proposition 1 (Reputation and forecast accuracy).
(i) When a single analyst covers a firm, his reputation, θ˜i(fi, pi), is monotonic in his
forecast accuracy.
(ii) When two analysts cover the same firm, the new analyst’s reputation, θ˜n(fn, fe, pi),
is not monotonic in his forecast accuracy if the established analyst is sufficiently
likely to be competent, and the correlation between competent analysts is suffi-
ciently high. That is, if θ < θe and ρ < ρ, where θ =
(g−b)(1−b)
g(1−b)−b(g−b) and
13
ρ = (g−b)(1−b−θe(g−b))
θeg(1−g) .
Otherwise, the new analyst’s reputation, θ˜n(·), is monotonic in his forecast accu-
racy.
Proof: See Appendix.
When only one analyst covers a firm, his reputation is monotonic in his forecast
accuracy. The intuition for this monotonicity is simple; a more competent analyst ob-
serves more accurate information than a less competent one. Thus, an accurate forecast
is more likely to be issued by a competent analyst, which results in a better reputation.
However, when there is more than one analyst who covers a firm, information about an
analyst’s competency arises from his forecast accuracy and his peer’s forecast. Since
competent analysts are assumed to observe (conditionally) correlated information, one
analyst’s forecast may be informative about the competency of another analyst. Propo-
sition 1 suggests that when the established analyst is sufficiently likely to be competent,
and the correlation between competent analysts is sufficiently high, then the reputation
of the new analyst is not monotonic in his forecast accuracy. The intuition for this result
comes from the information that investors infer when both analysts issue similar fore-
casts compared to the case when analysts disagree about the expected firm’s earnings.
If the established analyst is believed to be of high competency and the information of
competent analysts is highly correlated, then the new analyst is better off when his
forecast is not accurate but similar to that of the established analyst than being more
accurate while disagreeing with the established analyst’s forecast.
Remark 2. Reputation (non-)monotonicity is independent of the distribution of the
new analyst’s competency, θn.
Proposition 1 suggests that the new analyst’s reputation is not necessarily mono-
tonic in his forecast accuracy. Moreover, according to the remark above, this result
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is independent of investors’ initial beliefs about the new analyst’s competency. To il-
lustrate this point let γn =
1−θn
θn
denote the ratio of incompetent to competent new
analysts. Any change in γn does not affect the relative ranking of ex-post reputation,
e.g., θ˜n(f
m
n , f
v
n , pi
m) compared to θ˜n(f
v
n , f
v
n , pi
m). Changes in the ex-post reputations
relative ranking can only arise from the additional information that arises from the
established analyst’s forecast, which depends on his perceived competency and the cor-
relation of analysts’ signals but is independent of the new analyst’s initial reputation,
θn.
The assumption of correlated signals for competent analysts is similar to that of
Scharfstien and Stein (1990), where competent managers, who care about their rep-
utation, observe fully correlated information and invest sequentially. They show that
managers herd in their investment decisions. That is, they ignore their private infor-
mation to appear as being well informed. In contrast, in this paper of simultaneous
forecasting game, analysts issue forecasts according to their information. Note, however,
that the lack of monotonicity arises because of the correlation between the signals of
competent analysts, which is in contrast to the prevalent assumption in prior literature
of (conditionally) independent signals, see for example Trueman (1994).14 If analysts’
information is independent of each other, then an analyst’s reputation is independent
of the other analysts’ forecasts and, therefore, monotonic in the forecast accuracy.
Remark 3. If ρ = 0 then θ˜i(fi, f−i, pi) = θ˜i(fi, pi)
The correlation of information of competent analysts may be due to common indus-
try knowledge or because of similarities in the models that analysts use to predict firms’
earnings. Proposition 1 suggests that investors’ beliefs that determine analysts’ repu-
tation and their compensation may develop differently for analysts who cover different
14Banerjee (2020) analyzes a model with correlated signals, however, in his model analysts do not
differ in their abilities, and accordingly, they do not maximize their future reputation.
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firms. Thus, analysts of varying abilities may expect to develop different reputations
depending on which of the firms they are assigned to cover.
Claim 1. A competent analyst is expecting to gain a better reputation when covering
a firm that is also covered by other analysts than covering a firm exclusively, and vice
versa for an incompetent analyst. Formally, Let A be a firm covered by two analysts
and B a firm covered by a single analyst, then
E[θ˜n,B(fn,B, piB)|n is good] < E[θ˜n,A(fn,A, fe,A, piA)|n is good]
E[θ˜n,A(fn,A, fe,A, piA)|n is bad] < E[θ˜n,B(fn,B, piB)|n is bad]
Proof: See Appendix.
According to Claim 1, a competent analyst is better off when he is assigned to cover
the same firm as the established one, as opposed to being the only analyst covering
a firm, and vice versa for an incompetent one. Analysts may have some influence on
which firm they cover. The next Section considers the possibility that some analysts
can choose the firm they cover.
4 Endogenous coverage decisions
In this section, I consider analysts’ decisions as to which firm to cover. Analysts may
have no discretion as to which firm they may cover, i.e., they are exogenously assigned
to cover a particular firm. Exogenous coverage may be due to, for example, cases
where brokerage houses seek brokerage business or because their clients are interested
in specific firms. On the other hand, some analysts can influence the decision of which
firms they cover. Lee and So (2017) provide empirical evidence that analysts initiate
coverage based on private information, while McNichols and O’Brien (1997) suggest
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that terminating coverage may be due to private information. Accordingly, I assume
that with probability q an analyst has full discretion over which firm he covers, while
with probability 1 − q he is assigned to either firm A or B with equal probability.15 I
further assume that firm A is covered by an established analyst, e, while firm B has no
prior analyst coverage.
The primary consideration of this section is whether analysts of different abilities
differ in their coverage decisions. In such a case, investors must take the analyst’s
coverage decision into account when they assess his ability.
The updating process is then two-fold; first, investors update their prior beliefs about
the analyst’s ability based on the firm he covers, even before he issues his forecast. Based
on analysts’ forecasts and earnings realizations, investors update their beliefs about an
analyst’s competency once again.
The analysis focuses on a new analyst, n, who has discretion over the firm he covers.
A strategy for the analyst is comprised of the firm he chooses to cover, j ∈ {A,B},
and the forecast he issues, fn,j ∈ F . Note that an analyst first chooses which firm to
cover, and observes a signal about that firm’s earnings only after he decides to follow
that firm.
Because of the sequential nature of the game, I adjust the equilibrium concept
to Perfect Sequential Equilibrium (henceforth equilibrium), as in Grossman and Perry
(1986). Now, an equilibrium is comprised of the new analyst’s strategy, σi(si) = (j, fi,j),
and investors’ beliefs regarding his ability, θ˜i(Info), where investors’ information set is
comprised of the firm that the new analyst covers, his earnings forecast, the established
analyst’s forecast, when it exists, and the firm’s earnings. Note that if q < 1, then the
new analyst’s initiation of coverage does not entirely reveal whether he was exogenously
assigned to cover that firm or elected to cover that firm. Hence, only in the case of q = 1
15The assumption of equal probability is for convenience only; assuming any fixed probability to be
less than one will not affect the results. Also, recall that an analyst can cover at most one firm.
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I specify the off-equilibrium beliefs regarding the firm that the new analyst covers. In
the case of q < 1, covering either of the firms is on the equilibrium path, and thus does
not require off-equilibrium beliefs.
To simplify the analysis, I first note that under the assumption that α = 1
2
, in
equilibrium, analysts issue their forecasts according to their signals, regardless of the
firm they choose to cover.
Remark 4. Let Assumption 1 hold. In equilibrium, for any firm j that the new analyst
covers
fn,j(sn,j) =
 f
v
n,j if sn,j = s
v
n,j
fmn,j if sn,j = s
m
n,j
Proof: See Appendix.
The reason that analysts issue forecasts according to their signals, as for the ex-
ogenous coverage case, is the two-stage updating process. Initially, investors update
their beliefs about the analyst type based on the firm he covers, i.e., they hold new
(posterior) beliefs about his ability, and then use these posterior beliefs as the basis
for another update based on the earnings forecasts and realization. In other words,
the analyst’s choice of the forecast he issues comes after investors have embedded the
analyst’s choice of firm coverage into their beliefs, and so, the forecast is independent
of the coverage decision.
I commence the analysis with the case of q = 1, i.e., the new analyst has full
discretion over the firm he covers. The next proposition suggests that in this case,
in equilibrium, both types of analysts pool together to cover the same firm as the
established analyst.
Proposition 2 (A pooling equilibrium).
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Let q = 1, then the new analyst always chooses to cover firm A, regardless of his type,
and the off-equilibrium beliefs are given by θ˜n,B(information) = 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
When the new analyst chooses the firm he covers for sure, then only a pooling
equilibrium exists where both types choose to cover firm A, the firm already covered
by the established analyst. The intuition behind this result is simple: When the new
analyst has full discretion over coverage, if analysts of different types would differ in
their coverage choices, investors can identify the analyst’s type for sure. Hence, a
less competent analyst must pool together with a competent analyst so that a pooling
equilibrium can exist. The only pooling equilibrium that holds under the Grossman-
Perry refinement is the one where both types cover firm A, since in such a case, only an
incompetent analyst has the incentive to deviate, but does not do so because of the off-
equilibrium beliefs. The case where both types cover firm B cannot hold in equilibrium
since there are no off-equilibrium beliefs that can support such an equilibrium. Such off-
equilibrium beliefs must induce the high type analyst not to deviate, which is impossible
under the Grossman-Perry refinement.
I now turn to analyze the case of q < 1, i.e., where, with some probability (less
than one), the new analyst may choose the firm he covers but may also be exogenously
assigned to cover each of the firms (with the complementary probability). Therefore,
when investors observe the new analyst coverage, they cannot discern his type for sure,
even in a separating equilibrium. However, investors update their beliefs about the new
analyst’s ability based on the firm he covers. The next proposition characterizes the
equilibrium in this case.
Proposition 3 (Separating equilibria).
Let q < 1. There exists q∗ such that:
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- if q < q∗, then, in a pure strategy separating equilibrium, a competent analyst
covers firm A while an incompetent analyst covers firm B.
- if q∗ < q < 1, then, in equilibrium, a competent analyst covers firm A (with
probability 1) while an incompetent analyst mixes between the two firms.
Proof: See Appendix.
When some analysts can choose the firm they cover while for others coverage is ex-
ogenously determined, analysts of different abilities differ in their coverage choices, at
least with positive probability. Analysts differ in their coverage decisions because of
the ability of incompetent analysts to choose the firm they cover without fully reveal-
ing their lack of competency. If the probability of discretion for coverage is small, i.e.,
only a small fraction of the analysts can choose which firm to cover, then the effect of
analyst coverage on investors’ beliefs regarding his ability (before he issues a forecast)
is limited. Hence, an incompetent analyst chooses to cover firm B while a competent
analyst covers firm A. Differences in coverage decisions of analysts of varying abilities
affect investors’ beliefs before analysts issue any forecast.
Corollary 1. Before forecasts are issued, an analyst has a better reputation if he covers
firm A than if he covers firm B.
That is, θ˜n(j = B) < θ˜n(j = A).
According to Proposition 4, the probability that the new analyst is competent is
larger if he covers firm A than when he covers firm B before he issues an earnings
forecast. The intuition lies in the possibility that the analyst had discretion over which
firm to cover; A competent analyst will choose to cover firm A while an incompetent
one will cover firm B. Thus, an analyst is more likely to be competent if he starts
covering the same firm as others than one who initiates coverage for a firm without
prior analysts’ coverage.
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When it is highly likely that analysts have the discretion to choose the firm they
cover, a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist. On the one hand, investors assign
a high weight to the possibility that the new analyst had discretion over coverage;
while on the other hand, there is some (perhaps small) probability that the analyst
was assigned to the firm he covers. If the new analyst can choose the firm he covers,
then a competent one always prefers to cover firm A. An incompetent analyst has to
balance his incentive to cover firm B, where he expects a better reputation based on
his forecast, against the incentive to pretend to be competent by covering firm A. In
equilibrium, an incompetent analyst mixes between coverage of firm A or B, and thus
expects to achieve the same reputation from covering each of the firms. Nonetheless,
before the new analyst issues his forecast, the probability that he is of high ability is
higher when he covers firm A than when he covers firm B, as was in the pure strategy
case.
Remark 5. The equilibrium coverage choices of analysts of different abilities are inde-
pendent of the new analyst’s competency distribution, θn.
According to Proposition 3, analysts of different abilities differ in their coverage
choices; these choices are independent of the new analyst’s initial reputation, θn. The
intuition for this general result is that analysts are conscious of their abilities. According
to Claim 1, a competent analyst is better off when covering firm A because of the excess
information arising when covering that firm, and vice versa for an incompetent analyst,
regardless of the new analyst’s competency distribution. Therefore, the new analyst’s
coverage decision is independent of the prior distribution of types but rather depends
on the expected information that investors obtain when he covers each of the firms.
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5 Forecasting bias
Prior literature argues that analysts’ earnings forecasts might not reveal all the infor-
mation analysts possess because analysts may bias their forecasts. In this section, I
relax Assumption 1 to consider the case of forecasting bias and the effect of analysts’
coverage decisions on such a bias.
Let ∆ be a probability measure over F , and let σki (ski ) = Pr(fki |ski ).16 An analyst
issues a truthful forecast if σki (s
k
i ) = 1, i.e., if he issues a forecast according to his
signal. An analyst’s forecast is biased if σki (s
k
i ) < 1, i.e., the analyst issues a forecast
that does not corresponds to his signal with positive probability. A truthful forecast is
a one-to-one mapping from signals to forecasts; thus, it enables investors to deduce the
information an analyst observed from the forecast he issues. Although investors learn
the underlying signal for sure, the accuracy of the signal is unknown because it depends
on the (unobserved) analyst type. In contrast, a biased forecast is a stochastic mapping
from signal to forecast, and thus negatively affects the information that investors may
learn. The next proposition characterizes the parameter set under which analysts issue
truthful or biased forecasts.
Proposition 4 (Truthful and biased forecasts).
1. Let α ≤ b. The equilibrium remains as in Lemma 0.
That is, analysts issue truthful forecasts regardless of their type.
2. Let b < α.
(i) There does not exist a pure strategy equilibrium of truthful forecasts, i.e., an
equilibrium such that σki (s
k
i ) = 1.
(ii) There exists an equilibrium such that a competent analyst issues a truthful
forecast, while an incompetent analyst mixes after observing the signal svi and
16I forgo the firm’s index for the moment.
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forecasts truthfully after observing the signal smi . That is, σ
v
i (s
v
i |n is bad) <
1, and σki (s
k
i ) = 1 if n is good or k 6= v.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 4 suggests that a competent analyst always issues a forecast according to
his signal while an incompetent analyst biases his forecast when moderate earnings,
pim, are more prevalent, i.e., when 1
2
< α, and his information is of low accuracy, i.e.,
low values of b. Whether or not an incompetent analyst issues a biased forecast is
independent of the firm he covers. The reason for forecasting bias arises from the weak
information an incompetent analyst possesses; when b < α, an incompetent analyst
attributes higher probability to moderate earnings, pim, than to extreme earnings, piv,
even after observing an extreme signal, svi , regardless of the firm he covers. Since
analysts aim to appear well informed by issuing a forecast that corresponds to the
firm’s earnings, an incompetent analyst has an incentive to issue a forecast of fmi even
after observing the signal svi . On the other hand, when such a bias exists, an analyst
is more likely to be competent when he issues an extreme forecast, f vi . As a result,
an incompetent analyst may benefit from issuing an extreme forecast, and so, mixes
between the two possible forecasts.
The reasons that induce incompetent analysts to bias their forecasts are present for
any firm the analysts cover. According to Proposition 4, when an incompetent analyst’s
information is relatively inaccurate, i.e., b < α, he may bias his forecast regardless of
the firm he covers. Nevertheless, an incompetent analyst expects to build a different
reputation when he covers firm A or B. Therefore, the firm that an incompetent analyst
covers affects the magnitude of the bias, as suggested by the next proposition.
Proposition 5 (Coverage and the magnitude of bias).
An incompetent analyst biases his forecast more when he covers firm A than when he
covers firm B. That is, σvi,B(s
v
i |n is bad) < σvi,A(svi |n is bad).
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Proof: See Appendix.
According to Proposition 9, I expect an incompetent analyst to bias his forecast more
when he covers the same firm as the established analyst than in the case he is the only
one who follows the firm. The intuition behind Proposition 9 is as follows: Incompetent
analysts bias their forecasts in case the signal they observe is not sufficient to change
their perception for the more likely state, i.e., the firm’s earnings, independently of
the firm they cover. However, the reputation they gain from providing a forecast that
reflects the firm’s earnings depends on the firm they cover. When the new analyst
covers firm A, together with the established ones, he gains more if he also issues the
same forecast as the established analyst issues. An incompetent analyst expects the
established analyst to issue a forecast according to the more likely state, i.e., pim. Thus,
when covering firmA, an incompetent analyst has a greater incentive to bias his forecast,
that is, to issue a forecast according to the more likely event of moderate earnings.
6 Discussion and empirical implications
The previous sections’ results may explain the mixed empirical findings in past litera-
ture and provide new insight for future empirical tests. In the following, I explore a few
empirical implications. The first implication focuses on the effect of analyst forecast
accuracy on career outcomes. While several empirical papers analyzed the relationship
between analyst forecast accuracy and career outcomes, which they use as a proxy for
reputation, mixed results were found. For example, Hong and Kubik (2003) show that
analysts with more accurate forecasts than others are more likely to move on to more
prestigious brokerage houses; on the other hand, Makhil et al. (2003) did not find such
an effect. The results provide a possible explanation to the mixed results; reputation
may be non-monotonic in forecast accuracy, depending on the (conditional) correlation
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of analysts’ information. Proposition 1 suggests that reputation is monotonic in fore-
cast accuracy if the correlation between competent analysts’ information is not too high.
Thus, to examine the effect of forecast accuracy on future career outcomes, one must
first control for the correlation between analysts’ information, for example, through
the correlation of their previous forecasts. It is important to note that most empiri-
cal studies do not use the absolute forecast accuracy but rather the relative forecast
accuracy. Nonetheless, the correlation of information still plays a significant role in
analysts’ reputations. To illustrate this point, let us assume a firm that is covered by
three analysts. Consider the case where two of the analysts provide similar forecasts,
which are less accurate (ex-post) than the forecast of the third. If competent analysts’
information is highly correlated, then the two analysts who provide similar forecasts
should experience a better outcome than the third one who is more accurate.
The second implication arises from the notion that analysts of different abilities are
likely to cover different firms if they have (some) discretion over coverage. The results
suggest that the career outcomes of analysts who initiate coverage for firms with more
existing coverage should outperform those who cover firms on an exclusive basis. While
I am not aware of an empirical study that answers this question directly, Crawford et
al. (2012) may provide a shred of initial evidence for this paper’s new insight; they
show that the information content of an analyst who is the first to initiate coverage
for a firm differs from that of an analyst who covers a firm with established coverage.
An analyst who covers a firm exclusively provides general information about the firm,
thus increases the synchronicity with the industry earnings. In contrast, an analyst
who covers a firm where prior coverage exists provides firm-specific information that
reduces this synchronicity. It is an empirical question of whether analysts who are the
first ones to initiate coverage of a firm, experience different career outcomes than those
who initiate coverage of firms with prior analyst coverage.
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Lastly, I have shown that forecasting bias varies with analyst coverage; less com-
petent analysts are likely to bias their forecasts toward their prior expectations when
covering firms with additional analyst coverage more than they would when covering a
firm exclusively. Moreover, bold forecasts are more likely to be issued by more compe-
tent analysts covering the same firm as others. Thus, I expect bold forecasts to be more
accurate for firms with greater coverage. Accordingly, I can expect a more significant
price impact of bold forecasts for firms with more coverage. Whether bold forecasts
have different price impact for firms with more analyst coverage as compared to firms
with single analyst coverage seems to be an interesting empirical question.
7 Concluding Remarks
It has been demonstrated in past literature that sell-side analysts differ in abilities.
Forecast accuracy is commonly used, in the theoretical and empirical literature, to
identify differences in analysts’ abilities, which is not surprising because of its observ-
ability. However, analyst initiations of coverage, which is another analyst’s observable
action, has been overlooked by theoretical and empirical studies when trying to differen-
tiate competent analysts from less competent ones. In this paper, I study how coverage
decisions vary for analysts of heterogeneous abilities and demonstrate that initiation
of coverage may provide information about analysts’ abilities. An essential feature in
the model is the conditional correlation of information of more able analysts. Many
theoretical and empirical studies focus on the monotonic relations between forecast ac-
curacy and reputation. In contrast, I show that correlated information may result in
non-monotonic relations of forecast accuracy and reputation. This result might suggest
an explanation for the mixed results in the empirical literature that examines the ef-
fect of forecast accuracy on analysts’ careers. Lastly, I offer additional insight into the
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tendency of less competent analysts to bias their forecasts, illustrating the impact of
analysts’ coverage on forecasting bias.
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Appendix A - Proofs
Proof of Remark 1: Assume that a good type analyst issues a forecast from the set
Fgood while a bad type analyst issues a forecast from the set F bad and that there exists
a forecast f˜ such that f˜ ∈ F bad but f˜ /∈ Fgood: Then issuing forecast f˜ must result
in Pr(type is good|f˜) = 0. Thus, in equilibrium, a bad type analyst will never issue
forecast f˜ . 
It is useful to present the new analyst’s reputation for a given forecast, firm’s
earnings, and, if it exists, the established analyst’s forecast, i.e., θ˜n(fn(σn), pi) and
θ˜n(fn(σn), fe(σe), pi), when analysts use pure strategies. Without loss of generality, we
assume that the pure strategies are such that fmi (f
v
i ) corresponds to s
m
i (s
v
i ); We adjust
the reputation to include mixed strategies and specify these mixed strategies to prove
the results of Section 5.
Assume analysts use pure strategies of the form
fi(si) =
 f
v
i if si = s
v
i
fmi if si = s
m
i
The ex-post reputation for a new analyst that covers a firm exclusively is given by:
θ˜n(f
m, pi = pim) = θ˜n(f
v, pi = piv) =
gθ
gθ + b(1− θ)
θ˜n(f
m, pi = piv) = θ˜n(f
v, pi = pim) =
(1− g)θ
(1− g)θ + (1− b)(1− θ)
The ex-post reputation for a new analyst that covers a firm that is also covered by the
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established analyst is given by:
θ˜n(f
m
n , f
m
e , pi
m) = θ˜n(f
v
n , f
v
e , pi
v) =
= θn(θe(ρg+(1−ρ)g
2)+(1−θe)gb)
θn(θe(ρg+(1−ρ)g2)+(1−θe)gb)+(1−θn)(θebg+(1−θe)b2)
θ˜n(f
m
n , f
v
e , pi
m) = θ˜n(f
v
n , f
m
e , pi
v) =
= θn(θe(1−ρ)g(1−g)+(1−θe)g(1−b))
θn(θe(1−ρ)g(1−g)+(1−θe)g(1−b))+(1−θn)(θeb(1−g)+(1−θe)b(1−b))
θ˜n(f
m
n , f
m
e , pi
v) = θ˜n(f
v
n , f
v
e , pi
m) =
= θn(θe(ρ(1−g)+(1−ρ)(1−g)
2)+(1−θe)(1−g)(1−b))
θn(θe(ρ(1−g)+(1−ρ)(1−g)2)+(1−θe)(1−g)(1−b))+(1−θn)(θe(1−b)(1−g)+(1−θe)(1−b)2)
θ˜n(f
m
n , f
v
e , pi
v) = θ˜n(f
v
n , f
m
e , pi
m) =
= θn(θe(1−ρ)g(1−g)+(1−θe)(1−g)b)
θn(θe(1−ρ)g(1−g)+(1−θe)(1−g)b)+(1−θn)(θe(1−b)g+(1−θe)(1−b)b)
Proof of Lemma 1: Analysts maximize their reputation. That is
MaxfnE[θ˜n(fn, pi)|sn]
if the new analyst covers a firm exclusively, and
MaxfnE[θ˜n(fn, fe, pi)|sn]
if he covers the same firm as the established analyst. Where the conditional expectation
is over earnings and, if it exists, the established analyst’s forecast.
Let us assume that investors believe that analysts issue forecasts according to their sig-
nals, so reputation is determined accordingly. We have to show that analysts maximize
their reputation when issuing forecasts that reflects their signals.
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When an analyst of type t ∈ {good, bad} observes the signal sn his posterior distri-
bution for the possible firm’s earnings is given in (1). For α = 1
2
we get
Pr(pim|smi ) = Pr(piv|svi ) = p
Pr(pim|svi ) = Pr(piv|smi ) = 1− p
where p ∈ {g, b}. Recall that 1
2
< b.
First, when the new analyst covers a firm exclusively the expected reputation given a
signal sn is
E[θ˜n(fn, pi)|sn] = Pr(pim|sn)θ˜n(fn, pim) + Pr(piv|sn)θ˜n(fn, piv)
Now, note that for 0 < θ < 1, we get θ˜n(f
j′ , pij) < θ˜n(f
j, pij) where j ∈ {1, v} and
j′ 6= j, since b < g.
Second, when the new analyst covers the same firm as the established one, his
expected reputation given a signal sn is
E[θ˜n(fn, fe, pi)|sn] =
= Pr(pim|sn)Efe [θ˜n(fn, fe, pim)|sn] + Pr(piv|sn)Efe [θ˜n(fn, fe, piv)|sn]
= Pr(pim|sn)
(
Pr(sme |sn, pim)θ˜n(fn, fme , pim) + Pr(sve|sn, pim)θ˜n(fn, f ve , pim)
)
+Pr(piv|sn)
(
Pr(sme |sn, piv)θ˜n(fn, fme , piv) + Pr(sve|sn, piv)θ˜n(fn, f ve , piv)
)
To show that honest forecasts constitute an equilibrium, we have to show that upon
observing the signal sjn the new analyst expects higher reputation when issuing a forecast
of f jn than issuing the forecast f
j′
n .
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Note that
θ˜n(f
j
n, f
j′
e , pi
j) < θ˜n(f
j
n, f
j
e , pi
j) and θ˜n(f
j′
n , f
j′
e , pi
j) < θ˜n(f
j
n, f
j
e , pi
j) (4)
that is, the new analyst’s reputation is higher when both analysts issued accurate
forecast compared to 1. the case when only the established analyst was accurate, and
2. when both issued inaccurate forecasts.
In addition note that
θ˜n(f
j′
n , f
j
e , pi
j) < θ˜n(f
j′
n , f
j′
e , pi
j) and θ˜n(f
j′
n , f
j
e , pi
j) < θ˜n(f
j
n, f
j′
e , pi
j) (5)
That is, the new analyst’s reputation is lower when issuing an inaccurate forecast while
the established analysts issues an accurate one compared to: (i) the case were both
forecasts are inaccurate, and (ii) when the new analyst’s forecast is accurate while the
established one is inaccurate.
Combining the inequalities from (4) and (5) we get
|θ˜n(f j′n , f j
′
e , pi
j)− θ˜n(f jn, f j
′
e , pi
j)| < θ˜n(f jn, f je , pij)− θ˜n(f j
′
n , f
j
e , pi
j) (6)
Also, if a bad type analyst issues a forecast according to his signal, a good type
analyst will also do so. Now, for any signal sn, for a bad type analyst we get
Pr(sj
′
e |pij, sn) < Pr(sje|pij, sn)
where j′ 6= j.
Thus, together with the fact that Pr(pij
′|sjn) < Pr(pij|sjn) and (6) we get that upon
observing the signal sjn the new analyst expects higher reputation when issue a forecast
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of f jn than when issuing the forecast f
j′
n .
Note that a pure strategy equilibrium is more informative than any mixed strategy
equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 1: According to Lemma 1 analysts issue forecasts according to
their signals.
(i) When the new analyst covers a firm exclusively, his reputation is monotonic in
his forecast accuracy. Formally,
θ˜n(f
j′
n , pi
j) < θ˜n(f
j
n, pi
j)
(1− g)θn
(1− g)θn + (1− b)(1− θn) <
gθn
gθn + b(1− θn)
⇐⇒ b < g
(ii) When the new analyst covers the same firm as the established one his reputation
is not monotonic when the reputation from being inaccurate is higher than the
reputation arising from an accurate forecast. This is only possible in the case
θ˜n(f
j
n, f
j′
e , pi
j) < θ˜n(f
j′
n , f
j′
e , pi
j)
θn(θe(1−ρ)g(1−g)+(1−θe)g(1−b))
θn(θe(1−ρ)g(1−g)+(1−θe)g(1−b))+(1−θn)(θeb(1−g)+(1−θe)b(1−b))
< θn(θe(ρ(1−g)+(1−ρ)(1−g)
2)+(1−θe)(1−g)(1−b))
θn(θe(ρ(1−g)+(1−ρ)(1−g)2)+(1−θe)(1−g)(1−b))+(1−θn)(θe(1−b)(1−g)+(1−θe)(1−b)2)
Simplifying this inequality we get that it holds, for any b, g, and θn, if and only
if (g−b)(1−b)
g(1−b)−b(g−b) < θe and
(g−b)(1−b−θe(g−b))
θeg(1−g) < ρ.

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Proof of Remark 2: Note that if ρ = 0 then
Pr(sn|se, pi) = Pr(sn ∩e ∩pi)
Pr(se ∩ pi) =
Pr(sn|pi)Pr(se|pi)
Pr(se|pi) = Pr(sn|pi)
Thus, the reputation of the new analyst is independent of the established analyst’s
forecast. 
Proof of Claim 1: Following Lemma 1, analysts issue forecasts according to their sig-
nals. Now,
E[θ˜n,B(fn,B, piB)| n’s type] =
Pr(pim|sjn, n’s type)θ˜n(f jn, pim) + Pr(piv|sjn, n’s type)θ˜n(f jn, piv)
and
E[θ˜n,A(fn,A, fe,A, piA)| n’s type] =
Pr(pim|sjn, n’s type)Ese|pim [θ˜n(fn, fe(se), pim)]
+Pr(piv|sjn, n’s type)Ese|piv [θ˜n(fn, fe(se), piv)]
where
Ese|pij ,sn [θ˜n(fn, fe(se), pi
j)] =
Pr(sje|pij, sn)θ˜n(fn, f je , pij) + Pr(sj
′
e |pij, sn)θ˜n(fn, f j
′
e , pi
j)
Let us assume, w.l.o.g., that the new analyst observes a signal of smn . From equation
(1) we get Pr(piv|sm) < Pr(pim|sm), regardless of his type.
Thus, differences in an analyst’s expected reputation can only arise from the probabil-
ities Pr(sje|pij, sn) and Pr(sj′e |pij, sn).
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From an incompetent analyst’s view point
Pr(sme |pim, smn ) = Pr(sme |pim) = eg + (1− e)b
and
Pr(sve|pim, smn ) = Pr(sve|pim) = e(1− g) + (1− e)(1− b)
That is, the probability that the established analyst observes a signal sje is independent
of the signal an incompetent analyst observes.
However, for a competent analyst
Pr(sme |pim, smn ) = e(ρ+ (1− ρ)g) + (1− e)b
and
Pr(sve|pim, smn ) = e(1− ρ)(1− g) + (1− e)(1− b)
Since,
(eg+(1−e)b)θ˜n(fmn , fme , pim)+(e(1−g)+(1−e)(1−b))θ˜n(fmn , f ve , pim) < θ˜n(fmn , pim)
and
(eg+ (1− e)b)θ˜n(fmn , f ve , piv) + (e(1− g) + (1− e)(1− b))θ˜n(fmn , fme , piv) < θ˜n(f vn , pim)
an incompetent analyst is better off covering firm B.
34
In contrast,
θ˜n(f
m
n , pi
m) < (e(ρ+ (1− ρ)g) + (1− e)b)θ˜n(fmn , fme , pim)
+(e(1− ρ)(1− g) + (1− e)(1− b))θ˜n(fmn , f ve , pim)
and
θ˜n(f
v
n , pi
m) < (e(1− ρ)g + (1− e)b)θ˜n(fmn , f ve , piv)
+(e(ρ+ (1− ρ)(1− g) + (1− e)(1− b)θ˜n(fmn , fme , piv)
Thus, a competent analyst is better off when covering firm A. 
Proof of Remark 3: Follows immediately from the sequential nature of the Bayesian
updating about the analyst’s type. 
Proof of Proposition 2: Let q = 1. First, note that the equilibrium must be a pooling
equilibrium; if a separating equilibrium exists, investors identify the underlying type
of the analyst with probability 1, and thus, an incompetent analyst would deviate to
cover the other firm.
There are two possible pooling equilibria: where both types cover firm A, or B.
When analysts of both types cover firm A and the off-equilibrium beliefs are such
that Pr(type is good|jcovers B) = 0, then each of the possible types is worse off if
the analyst deviates to cover firm B. The off-equilibrium beliefs satisfy the Grossman-
Perry refinement criterion since even if both types were assumed to deviate, a competent
analyst would not deviate because, according to Claim 1, he is better off covering firm
A.
The case where both types cover firm B cannot hold in equilibrium. Assume that
both types cover firm B; then according to the Grossman-Perry criterion, any off-
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equilibrium beliefs must include a deviation by competent analysts because if both
types where to deviate, a competent analyst is better-off doing so. However, for such
off-equilibrium beliefs a competent analyst would deviate and cover firm A, in contrast
to the equilibrium strategies. 
Proof of Proposition 3: I start by showing that a pure strategy separating equilibrium
can hold only for some q∗.
First note that the only possible separating equilibrium is when a competent analyst
covers firm A while an incompetent one covers firm B. The opposite case cannot hold
in equilibrium for the reason I show in the followings.
Since q < 1 coverage of either of the firms is on the equilibrium path, and thus, no
off-equilibrium beliefs should be specified.
Let θn,j = Pr(n is good|n covers firm j). Under this pure strategy separating equi-
librium we get
θn,j =

1
2
(1 + q) if j = A
1
2
(1− q) if j = B
Let Ut,j = Es,pi[θ˜n(·)|θn,j, t] denote the expected reputation for the new analyst of type
t who covers firm j.
First, note that Ut,A is increasing in q while Ut,B is decreasing in q.
Second, note that in this separating equilibrium, for any q a competent analyst it
is always better off when covering firm A than B, because q = 0 is equivalent to the
exogenous assignment case.
Now, for an incompetent analyst, for q = 0 he expects the same reputation as in
the exogenous case, so Ubad,A < Ubad,B. For q → 1, under the proposed equilibrium
strategies, we get 0 = Ut,B < Ut,A = 1. Since Ut,j is continuous in q, there exists q
∗
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such that for any q ≤ q∗ we have Ut,A < Ut,B, so a bad type analyst has no profitable
deviation, and the pure strategies equilibrium holds.
For q∗ < q the suggested pure strategy equilibrium cannot hold since an incompe-
tent analyst always has a profitable deviation.
Assume q∗ < q. I will show that there exists an equilibrium where a competent
analyst covers firm A for sure while an incompetent analyst mixes between the two
firms.
Let γ denote the probability that an incompetent analyst covers firm A. Note that,
in equilibrium, investors beliefs are consistent with γ. That is, θn,j(γ) is determined
according to the equilibrium value of γ. Formally,
θn,j(γ) =
 q(θ + (1− θ)γ) +
1
2
(1− q) if j = A
q(1− θ)(1− γ) + 1
2
(1− q) if j = B
Assume γ = 1. that is, an incompetent analyst covers firm A for sure. Since also a
competent analyst cover firm A, analysts expect the same payoff as in the exogenous
case. Thus, according to Lemma 1 we have Ubad,A < Ubad,B.
Assume γ = 0. that is, an incompetent analyst covers firm B for sure. In other
words, analysts strategies are the same as under the pure strategy equilibrium above.
Since, q∗ < q we know that Ubad,B < Ubad,A.
One can observe that θn,j(γ) is continuous in γ, thus, also Ubad,B and Ubad,A are
continuous in γ. Therefore, there exists a unique γ such that Ubad,B = Ubad,A, which is
the equilibrium level of mixing.
Note that the mix strategy equilibrium above is more informative than a pure strat-
egy equilibrium where the new analyst covers firm A for sure. The reason for a mix
strategy equilibrium being more informative is the information investors learn about
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the new analyst type. 
Proof of Corollary 1: Follows directly from the proof of Proposition 3. 
Proof of Proposition 4: Assume 1
2
< α.
After observing a signal sn the new analyst updates the earnings distribution ac-
cording to (1). For an incompetent analyst who observes a signal svn we get
Pr(pim|svn) < Pr(piv|svn)⇔ α < b
and
Pr(piv|svn) < Pr(pim|svn)⇔ b < α
Similarly,
Pr(sme |svn) < Pr(sve|svn)⇔ α < b and Pr(sve|svn) < Pr(sme |svn)⇔ b < α
Assume α < b; then there exists an equilibrium as in Lemma 1. That is, each
analyst issues a forecast according to the more likely state, which is according to the
signal he observes.
Assume b < α.
First, note that truthful strategies cannot constitute an equilibrium. Assume that in-
vestors beliefs are such that each analyst issues a truthful forecast, then the ex-post
reputations θ˜n(fn, pi) and θ˜n(fn, fe, pi) are as specified above (Refer to the beginning of
the Appendix). Since b < α, from the point of view of an incompetent analyst who
observes the signal svn, the more likely state is pi
m. Therefore, he is better off deviating
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to issue the forecast fmn .
To show the mixed strategy equilibrium described in Proposition 4, one first has to
adjust the ex-post reputation equations in the beginning of the Appendix. Assume that
analysts issue forecasts according to the strategies specified in Proposition 4. Without
loss of generality, assume that the established analyst is known to be competent. Recall
that an incompetent analyst who observes the signal svn, issues the forecast f
v
n with
probability σvn; to avoid excessive notation let us denote σ
v
n = σ.
The ex-post refutation for an analyst who covers firm B is given by
θ˜n(f
m, pi = pim) =
gθ
gθ + (1− θ)(b+ (1− b)(1− σ))
θ˜n(f
m, pi = piv) =
(1− g)θ
(1− g)θ + (1− θ)(b(1− σ) + 1− b)
θ˜n(f
v, pi = piv) =
gθ
gθ + (1− θ)bσ
θ˜n(f
v, pi = pim) =
(1− g)θ
(1− g)θ + (1− θ)(1− b)σ
Let pv = Pr(piv|svn) and pm = Pr(pim|svn). The expected reputation for an incompe-
tent analyst who observes the signal svn and issues the forecast f
v
n is then
Umix(f
v) ≡ pmθ˜n(f v, pi = pim) + pvθ˜n(f v, pi = piv)
Onthe other hand, the expected reputation for an incompetent analyst who observes
the signal svn, issue the forecast f
m
n is
Umix(f
m) ≡ pmθ˜n(fm, pi = pim) + pvθ˜n(fm, pi = piv)
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Now, Umix(f
v) is decreasing in σ and Umix(f
m) is increasing in σ. Furthermore,
lim
σ→0
gθ
gθ + (1− θ) = Umix(f
m) < Umix(f
v) = 1
and
lim
σ→1
Umix(f
v) < Umix(f
m)
because pv < pm and (1−g)θ
(1−g)θ+(1−θ)(1−b) <
gθ
gθ+(1−θ)bσ
Thus, there exists a unique σ = σB such that Umix(f
v) = Umix(f
m).
The ex-post refutation for an analyst who covers firm A is given by
θ˜n(f
m
n , f
m
e , pi
m) =
θn(ρg + (1− ρ)g2)
θn(ρg + (1− ρ)g2) + (1− θn)g(b+ (1− b)(1− σ))
θ˜n(f
m
n , f
v
e , pi
m) =
θn(1− ρ)g(1− g)
θn(1− ρ)g(1− g) + (1− θn)(1− g)(b+ (1− b)(1− σ))
θ˜n(f
m
n , f
m
e , pi
v) = θn(ρ(1−g)+(1−ρ)(1−g)
2)
θn(ρ(1−g)+(1−ρ)(1−g)2)+(1−θn)(1−g)(b(1−σ)+(1−b))
θ˜n(f
m
n , f
v
e , pi
v) =
θn(1− ρ)g(1− g)
θn(1− ρ)g(1− g) + (1− θn)g(b(1− σ) + (1− b))
θ˜n(f
v
n , f
v
e , pi
v) =
θn(ρg + (1− ρ)g2)
θn(ρg + (1− ρ)g2) + (1− θn)bgσ
θ˜n(f
v
n , f
m
e , pi
v) =
θn(1− ρ)g(1− g)
θn(1− ρ)g(1− g) + (1− θn)b(1− g)σ
θ˜n(f
v
n , f
v
e , pi
m) =
θn(ρ(1− g) + (1− ρ)(1− g)2)
θn(ρ(1− g) + (1− ρ)(1− g)2) + (1− θn)(1− b)(1− g)σ
θ˜n(f
v
n , f
m
e , pi
m) =
θn(1− ρ)g(1− g)
θn(1− ρ)g(1− g) + (1− θn)g(1− b)σ
Similar to the analysis when the new analyst covers firm B, when the new analyst
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covers firm A let
UAmix(f
v) ≡ Epi,fe [θ˜n(f vn , fe, pi)|svn]
and
UAmix(f
m) ≡ Epi,fe [θ˜n(fmn , fe, pi)|svn]
Again UAmix(f
v) is decreasing in σ and UAmix(f
m) is increasing in σ. Furthermore,
lim
σ→0
UAmix(f
m) < UAmix(f
v) = 1
Let rm ≡ Pr(sme |svn) and rv ≡ Pr(sve|svn). Since pv < pm also rv < rm.
Therefore,
lim
σ→1
UAmix(f
v) < UAmix(f
m)
Thus, there exists a unique σ = σA such that U
A
mix(f
v) = UAmix(f
m). 
Proof of Proposition 5: Let Umix(f
m) and UAmix(f
m) denote the expected reputation of
an incompetent analyst who issues a forecast fmn after observing the signal s
m
n when he
covers firm B and A, respectively. Let pv, pm, rv, and rm be defined as in the proof of
Proposition 4. For any σ we have Umix(f
m) < UAmix(f
m) because pv < pm and rv < rm.
In a similar way let Umix(f
v) and UAmix(f
v). For any σ we have UAmix(f
v) < Umix(f
v).
Because the mixing weights are the solutions to Umix(f
m) = Umix(f
v) and UAmix(f
m) =
UAmix(f
v), we find that σA < σB. 
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Appendix B - Correlation of incompetent analysts’
signals
In this Appendix, I consider the case where the signals of incompetent analysts are
(conditionally) correlated rather than those of competent analysts’ signals. I show that
the main results of the paper remain qualitatively the same. Reputation is not neces-
sarily monotonic in forecast accuracy; a competent analyst is better off when he covers
the same firm as the established analyst, and vice versa for an incompetent analyst.
While the results are the same, some differences arise, which I emphasize in what follows.
Let us assume that the signals of competent analysts are independent of each other
as well as of the signal of incompetent analysts. On the other hand, assume that the
signals of two incompetent analysts, say 1 and 2, are conditionally correlated. Let the
signals of the two incompetent analysts be sj1 and s
j′
2 , j, j
′ ∈ {m, v}. Then
Pr(sj1 = s
j
2|pij) = ρb+ (1− ρ)b2
Pr(sj1, s
j
2|pij
′
) = ρ(1− b) + (1− ρ)(1− b)2 j 6= j′
Pr(sj1, s
j′
2 |pij) = Pr(sj
′
1 , s
j
2|pij) = (1− ρ)b(1− b) j 6= j′
Where the parameter ρ reflects the level of correlation.
As in Sections 3 and 4, we restrict attention to the case of uniform prior, i.e., α = 1
2
.
For a new analyst who covers firm B, the firm without prior coverage, the ex-post
reputation remains the same. On the other hand, the ex-post reputation for a new
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analyst who covers firm A is given by
θ˜n(f
m
n , f
m
e , pi
m) = θ˜n(f
v
n , f
v
e , pi
v) = θn(θeg
2+(1−θe)gb)
θn(θeg2+(1−θe)gb)+(1−θn)(θebg+(1−θe)(ρb+(1−ρ)b2))
θ˜n(f
m
n , f
v
e , pi
m) = θ˜n(f
v
n , f
m
e , pi
v) = θn(θeg(1−g)+(1−θe)g(1−b))
θn(θeg(1−g)+(1−θe)g(1−b))+(1−θn)(θeb(1−g)+(1−θe)(1−ρ)b(1−b))
θ˜n(f
m
n , f
m
e , pi
v) = θ˜n(f
v
n , f
v
e , pi
m) =
= θn(θe(1−g)
2+(1−θe)(1−g)(1−b))
θn(θe(1−g)2+(1−θe)(1−g)(1−b))+(1−θn)(θe(1−b)(1−g)+(1−θe)(ρ(1−b)+(1−ρ)(1−b)2))
θ˜n(f
m
n , f
v
e , pi
v) = θ˜n(f
v
n , f
m
e , pi
m) = θn(θeg(1−g)+(1−θe)(1−g)b)
θn(θeg(1−g)+(1−θe)(1−g)b)+(1−θn)(θe(1−b)g+(1−θe)(1−ρ)b(1−b))
I begin by showing that a pure strategy equilibrium exists, when analysts issue forecasts
according to their signals; Clearly, this is also the most informative equilibrium.
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, analysts issue forecasts according to their signals. That is
fi(si) =
 f
v
i if si = s
v
i
fmi if si = s
m
i
Proof. For an analyst who covers firm B the proof is the same as in Lemma 1.
For an analyst who covers firm A the expected reputation is
E[θ˜n(fn, fe, pi)|sn] =
= Pr(pim|sn)
(
Pr(sme |sn, pim)θ˜n(fn, fme , pim)Pr(sve|sn, pim)θ˜n(fn, f ve , pim)
)
+Pr(piv|sn)
(
Pr(sme |sn, piv)θ˜n(fn, fme , piv) + Pr(sve|sn, piv)θ˜n(fn, f ve , piv)
)
Where Pr(pij|sn) remains as in equation (1).
The analyst’s ex-post reputation is higher when his forecast is accurate, while the
established analyst’s forecast is inaccurate compared to the opposite case. Formally,
θ˜n(f
j′
n , f
j
e , pi
j) < θ˜n(f
j
n, f
j′
e , pi
j)
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Also, his reputation is higher when both analysts issue accurate forecasts than when
both issue inaccurate ones. Formally,
θ˜n(f
j′
n , f
j′
e , pi
j) < θ˜n(f
j
n, f
j
e , pi
j)
As before, Pr(pij
′ |sj) < Pr(pij|sj). Thus, an analyst is better off issuing the forecast
that is more likely to be accurate than the other possible forecast. In other words, in
equilibrium, analysts issue forecasts according to their signals. 
In the case of conditional correlation of incompetent analysts’ signals, there are a
few differences in analysts’ reputation that should be noted.
Observation 1.
1. θ˜n(f
j
n, f
j
e , pi
j) < θ˜n(f
j
n, f
j′
e , pi
j)
2. θ˜n(f
j′
n , f
j′
e , pi
j) < θ˜n(f
j′
n , f
j
e , pi
j)
When the signals of incompetent analysts are conditionally correlated, issuing the
same forecast as the other analyst is perceived somewhat negatively compared to the
case where conditional correlation is between competent analysts’ information. Thus,
an analyst is better off when he issues an accurate forecast while his peer’s forecast
is inaccurate compared to the case where both analysts issue accurate forecasts. In a
similar vein, an analyst is better off when he issues an inaccurate forecast while the
other issues an accurate one than when both issue inaccurate forecasts.
The correlation of information can also result in reputation non-monotonicity.
Proposition 6. When the signals of incompetent analysts are correlated, and the new
analyst covers the same firm as the established one, his reputation is not monotonic in
his forecast accuracy if the correlation is sufficiently high, i.e., ρ < ρ, and the established
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analyst is likely to be incompetent, i.e., θe < θ.
Where θ = b(1−g)
g(g−b)+b(1−g) and ρ =
(g−b)(θeg+(1−θe)b)
(1−θe)b(1−b) .
Proof. The new analyst’s reputation is non-monotonic in his forecast accuracy if
θ˜n(f
j
n, f
j
e , pi
j) < θ˜n(f
j′
n , f
j
e , pi
j). That is, when
θn(θeg2+(1−θe)gb)
θn(θeg2+(1−θe)gb)+(1−θn)(θebg+(1−θe)(ρb+(1−ρ)b2)) <
θn(θeg(1−g)+(1−θe)(1−g)b)
θn(θeg(1−g)+(1−θe)(1−g)b)+(1−θn)(θe(1−b)g+(1−θe)(1−ρ)b(1−b))
Simplifying the above inequality, we observe that it holds if and only if θe <
b(1−g)
g(g−b)+b(1−g)
and (g−b)(θeg+(1−θe)b)
(1−θe)b(1−b) < ρ. 
The next immediate question is whether analysts of different abilities differ in their
coverage preferences. One might think that because conditional correlation exists only
for signals of incompetent analysts, a competent analyst may be better off when covering
the firm without prior coverage, i.e., firm B, in contrast to the case where correlation is
between competent analysts, where a competent analyst is better off covering the same
firm as the established one, and vice versa for an incompetent analyst. Nevertheless, the
next proposition suggests that this logic is invalid. That is, a competent analyst expects
a better reputation when covering the same firm as the established one compared to
covering a firm exclusively, and vice versa for an incompetent analyst.
Proposition 7.
E[θ˜n,B(fn,B, piB)|n is good] < E[θ˜n,A(fn,A, fe,A, piA)|n is good]
E[θ˜n,A(fn,A, fe,A, piA)|n is bad] < E[θ˜n,B(fn,B, piB)|n is bad]
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Proof.
E[θ˜n,B(fn,B, piB)| n’s type] =
Pr(pim|sjn, n’s type)θ˜n(f jn, pim) + Pr(piv|sjn, n’s type)θ˜n(f jn, piv)
and
E[θ˜n,A(fn,A, fe,A, piA)| n’s type] = Pr(pim|sjn, n’s type)Ese|pim [θ˜n(fn, fe(se), pim)]
+Pr(piv|sjn, n’s type)Ese|piv [θ˜n(fn, fe(se), piv)]
where
Ese|pij ,sn [θ˜n(fn, fe(se), pi
j)] =
Pr(sje|pij, sn)θ˜n(fn, f je , pij) + Pr(sj
′
e |pij, sn)θ˜n(fn, f j
′
e , pi
j)
Now, Pr(pim|sjn, n’s type) is given in equation (1), and the set of ex-post reputation
is given above.
As before differences in an analyst’s expected reputation can arise only from the prob-
abilities Pr(sje|pij, sn) and Pr(sj′e |pij, sn).
Let us assume, w.l.o.g., that the new analyst observes the signal smn .
Since now the correlation is between the signals of incompetent analysts, they are the
ones who expect to observe similar signals. Hence, from an incompetent analyst’s point
of view
Pr(sme |pim, smn ) = eg + (1− e)(ρ+ (1− ρ)b
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and
Pr(sve|pim, smn ) = e(1− g) + (1− e)(1− ρ)(1− b)
However, for a competent analyst
Pr(sme |pim, smn ) = eg + (1− e)b
and
Pr(sve|pim, smn ) = e(1− g) + (1− e)(1− b)
Moreover, using the ex-post reputation derived above, we observe that
θ˜n(f
m
n , pi
m) < (eg+(1−e)b)θ˜n(fmn , fme , pim)+(e(1−g)+(1−e)(1−b))θ˜n(fmn , f ve , pim)
and
θ˜n(f
v
n , pi
m) <
(eg + (1− e)b)θ˜n(fmn , f ve , piv) + (e(1− g) + (1− e)(1− b))θ˜n(fmn , fme , piv)
< θ˜n(f
v
n , pi
m)
Thus, a competent analyst is better off when he covers firm A.
In contrast,
(eg + (1− e)(ρ+ (1− ρ)b))θ˜n(fmn , fme , pim)
+(e(1− g) + (1− e)(1− ρ)(1− b))θ˜n(fmn , f ve , pim) < θ˜n(fmn , pim)
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and
(eg + (1− e)(1− ρ)b)θ˜n(fmn , f ve , piv)
+(e(1− g) + (1− e)(ρ+ (1− ρ)(1− b))θ˜n(fmn , fme , piv) < θ˜n(f vn , pim)
Thus, an incompetent analyst is better off when covering firm B. 
The reason that an incompetent analyst is worse off when he covers firm A is that
he expects to issue the same forecast as the established analyst with more significant
probability than a competent analyst. In contrast, a competent analyst is more likely
to be accurate when the established analyst issues an inaccurate forecast, and thus,
expects to gain a better reputation when covering firm A.
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CHAPTER 2
Voluntary Disclosure of Firms Covered by Analysts
with Uncertain Forecasting Objective
co-authored with Beatrice Michaeli
1 Introduction
Corporate disclosures are the primary but not exclusive source of information in finan-
cial markets. Over the past several years, additional sources of information, such as
sell-side analysts, have captured the attention of researchers and regulators. This is not
surprising given that, in addition to directly mitigating information asymmetry in the
marketplace, these sources may have a significant impact on corporate disclosures. For
example, firms tend to provide favorable information, such as expected high market
demand, while concealing unfavorable information, such as expected low demand.17 In
their forecasts, analysts covering the same industry also provide relevant information to
the market participants. The economic incentives of analysts have long been debated
in the literature. Many analysts aim to issue accurate forecasts and achieve an All-star
analyst status.18 There is also empirical and anecdotal evidence that some analysts pro-
vide biased forecasts due to various economic incentives such as currying favor for firms
or generating trading commissions.19 It is unclear whether the possibly biased informa-
17Because of their uncertainty about what the firm knows, investors cannot unravel the firm’s
private information (Dye 1985).
18See for example Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1999), Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000).
19Evidence consistent with analysts maximizing trading volume to earn trading commissions has
been provided in Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm (2006) and Karmaziene (2020). Related, Cowen,
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tion provided by analysts in their forecasts encourages or curbs the firm’s tendency to
disclose its private information. In this paper, we analyze the effect of analyst coverage
with uncertain forecasting objective on corporate disclosures and market prices.
We consider a model where a firm (“it”), which may be endowed with information
about the product demand, decides whether to voluntarily (and truthfully) disclose this
information to investors (“they”). The firm maximizes the market price, which reflects
the investors’ expectations regarding the product demand in the market. The focus
of our study is the effect of analysts’ coverage—as an additional source of information
available to investors—on the firm’s tendency to disclose its private information.20 We
assume that an analyst (“she”) covers the firm’s industry and always observes infor-
mation about the market demand.21 Whether the analyst biases her forecast or issues,
in an accurate manner, her information about the market demand is only privately
known to the analyst. The investors, as well as the firm, are uncertain about the
analyst’s forecasting objective. We consider scenarios where the firm’s disclosure pre-
cedes or succeeds the issuance of the analyst’s forecast and illustrate the existence of
a unique threshold equilibrium, where the firm discloses favorable news and withholds
unfavorable ones.22
The firm’s information endowment is assumed to be independent of the analyst’s
Groysberg and Healy (2006), Jacob, Rock and Weber(2008), Agrawal and Chen (2007), and Clarke,
Khorana, Patel and Rau (2006) report that investment bank analysts tend to issue pessimistic forecasts.
In contrast, Brown, Foster and Noreen (1985), O’Brien (1988), Womack (1996), McNichols and O’Brien
(1997) and Hong and Kubik (2003) provide evidence consistent with positive bias. For a detailed
survey of the analysts’ literature, see Ramnath, Rock and Shane (2006). Schipper (1991) calls for
more research on analysts’ economic incentives.
20In addition to corporate disclosures, our model can be applied to a variety of contexts where a
party’s tendency to communicate private information may be affected by external sources of informa-
tion. For example, the model can be applied to a case of a politician disclosing information that voters
may also obtain from the media or political opponents.
21There is no inconsistency in assuming that the firm obtains information with some probability,
whereas the analyst always obtains information about an event occurring outside of the firm, e.g.,
future demand for products.
22As in Dye (1985), unraveling does not occur because of the uncertainty about the firm’s informa-
tion endowment.
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forecasting objective. Nevertheless, we demonstrate that the investors’ beliefs about
these uncertain events are endogenously intertwined and reinforce each other. For
example, when investors believe that the firm is informed, they believe that it is more
likely that the analyst is unbiased compared to the case where the firm is believed
to be uninformed. Thus, the analyst affects the market price not only through the
information she provides in her forecast (the direct effect) but also through the effect
her forecast has on investors’ beliefs regarding the firm’s information endowment (the
indirect effect), which, in turn, affects the firm’s disclosure decision.
We start with the case where the analyst issues the relevant forecast before the
firm can disclose information to the market. This situation may arise, for example,
when analysts provide their assessments about the industry they cover before the firm’s
conference call, where the firm’s management has the opportunity to communicate
information to investors. In this case, the firm observes the analyst’s forecast and may
respond by disclosing its assessment of the future demand. In equilibrium, for any
forecast issued by the analyst, the firm would respond only if its information exceeds
some threshold (that depends on the analyst’s forecast). We show that the firm may
respond even to positively biased forecasts, i.e., forecasts that assess higher demand
than can be indicated from the firm’s information. The intuition for this disclosure of
(seemingly) bad news is the uncertainty that the investors have regarding the analyst’s
forecasting objective. The investors are skeptical about the analyst’s forecast, and thus,
a positively biased forecast may lead to a market price that is below the one the firm
can achieve by disclosing information.
We proceed with the case where the firm’s possible disclosure precedes (or coin-
cides) with the analyst’s forecast. Since the firm does not observe the analyst’s forecast
when making its disclosure decision, it must form an expectation about the forecast.
We show that the firm may benefit from relying on the analyst to forecast the same
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information that the firm observed in a potentially biased way. This benefit arises from
the “reinforcement role” of forecasts on investors’ beliefs, and the investors’ uncertainty
about the analyst’s objective and the firm’s information endowment. Although we as-
sume that the firm’s information endowment is independent of the analyst’s forecasting
objective, the investors’ beliefs about these events are endogenously intertwined, and
reinforce each other. In particular, a product demand forecasted by the analyst that
is below the disclosure threshold strengthens the investors’ beliefs that the analyst is
unbiased, which in turn, reinforces investors’ beliefs that the firm is informed but did
not disclose. And vice versa: a forecast above the disclosure threshold is perceived to
be issued with higher probability by a biased analyst than by an unbiased one. There-
fore, such a forecast strengthens the investors’ beliefs that the firm is uninformed. Put
differently, the analyst’s forecast “reinforces” investors’ beliefs about the firm’s infor-
mation endowment—if the investors believe that the forecast is biased (unbiased), they
also believe that the firm is less (more) likely to be informed. The reinforcement role of
(potentially biased) forecasts is at the heart of our main results. We find that analyst
coverage succeeding corporate disclosures has a crowding-out effect in that a firm facing
coverage is less likely to disclose its information.
We also consider the optimal disclosure timing of the firm and show that firms
observing high product demand prefer to delay their disclosure until after the analyst
forecast. The reason is that by delaying disclosure they can only benefit from potential
nondisclosure at a later date. In contrast, firms observing unfavorable market demand
may benefit from credibly committing to nondisclosure prior to the analyst forecast (if
they could). Lastly, we extend our results to a setting in which the firm’s disclosure
timing is fixed, but the analyst can choose the timing at which she issues the forecast.
We illustrate that biased analysts may prefer to forecast early to preempt the firm’s
disclosure.
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Broadly speaking, our paper belongs to the analytical literature on voluntary disclo-
sure initiated by Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) and surveyed by Beyer, Cohen,
Lys, and Walther (2010). Similar to the analytical models of Dye (1985), Farrel and
Sobel (1983), and Jung and Kwon (1988), we allow for firms to be endowed with in-
formation about the state with some probability. However, unlike these papers, we
consider additional sources of information, in particular, a sell-side analyst who issues
a forecast that affects the firm’s price. Studying the effect this forecast has on volun-
tary disclosure, and the dynamic of interaction between the two means of information
transmissions is our main contribution to the literature on voluntary disclosure.
The effect of external sources of information on voluntary disclosure is also the fo-
cus of several recent papers. Frenkel, Guttman, and Kremer (2019) also consider a
disclosure problem where a firm faces analyst coverage.23 In a model where the proba-
bility that an analyst observes information depends on the probability that the firm is
endowed with information, they find that analyst coverage can crowd in or crowd out
voluntary disclosures.24 In contrast, we assume that the analyst always observes infor-
mation but may bias the information she forecasts. In our model, the probability that
the firm is endowed with information is independent of the probability that the forecast
is unbiased. Nevertheless, the investors’ beliefs about these events endogenously inter-
twined, and we find that analyst coverage suppresses voluntary disclosure. In addition
to studying the firm’s disclosure decision, Frenkel, Guttman, and Kremer (2019) study
stock price efficiency and liquidity, whereas we focus on the dynamic interaction be-
tween voluntary disclosure and analyst coverage.25 Our paper is also related to Einhorn
(2018), who analyzes voluntary disclosures in the presence of competing information
23In a related model, Ebert, Scha¨fer, and Schneider (2019) study different types of information
leaks.
24Dye and Sridhar (1995) consider a model with multiple firms where disclosure by one of the firms
causes an update in the investors’ beliefs about the information endowment of the other firms.
25In a model with a firm that cares about stock prices in two periods, Guttman, Kremer, and
Skrzypacz (2014) find that disclosing in the second period is interpreted more favorably.
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sources and explains a deviation from full disclosure equilibrium to one with partial
and selective disclosure.
Our analysis of disclosures preceding analysts’ forecasts is related to the literature
on uncertain investors’ reactions (e.g., Dutta and Trueman 2002 and Suijs 2007). While
this literature focuses on the uncertainty pertaining to how investors react to disclosure,
in our model, the uncertainty pertains to how investors react to nondisclosure. Our
analysis of disclosure succeeding analysts’ forecasts is related to the literature studying
shifts in the investors’ pre-disclosure expectations of the state (Jung and Kwon 1988,
Acharya, DeMarzo and Kremer 2011). In addition to affecting the investors’ prior
expectation of future demand, forecasts in our model also affect the investors’ beliefs
about the analyst’s forecasting objective and the firm’s information endowment.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the economic setting and consid-
ers as a benchmark the voluntary disclosure in the absence of analyst coverage. Section
3 discusses the market price and the reinforcement effect of analyst’s forecasts. Sec-
tion 4 considers the firm’s voluntary disclosure that succeeds or precedes the analyst
forecast. Section 5 studies the optimal timing of corporate disclosures and analyst’s
forecasts. Section 6 discusses empirical implications. Section 7 concludes.
2 Economic setting and benchmark
2.1 Setting
The model entails a firm (“it”) facing uncertain product demand. The payoff from
high demand is normalized to one, and the payoff from low demand is normalized to
zero. We assume that the likelihood of high demand, θ ∈ [0, 1], is distributed according
to a probability distribution function g(·) and a cumulative distribution function G(·),
with a prior expectation E[θ] = µ. The firm is informed about θ with probability
57
Pr(Inf ) = p ∈ (0, 1) and is uninformed with probability Pr(NoInf ) = 1 − p ∈ (0, 1).
Here, I = {Inf ,NoInf } denotes the firm’s information endowment, which we assume is
independent of θ. If the firm is informed about the value, it may voluntarily disclose it to
investors (“they”) at no cost. Following the voluntary disclosure literature, we assume
that any disclosed value is verifiable and thus truthful. If the firm is uninformed, it
cannot credibly communicate the lack of information endowment. For future reference,
d ∈ {θ, ∅} denotes the firm’s disclosure (d = θ) or lack of disclosure (d = ∅).
An analyst (“she”) covers the industry in which the firm operates and therefore
always observes information about the market demand.26 After observing θ, the analyst
releases a forecast f . The forecasting objective of the analyst is uncertain in the sense
that, with probability q ∈ (0, 1), she is unbiased, maximizes a payoff given by:
piU = −(f − θ)2 (7)
and issues an unbiased forecast that reflects the true state, f = θ.27 Otherwise, the
analyst is biased, maximizes a payoff given by:
piB = −(f − β)2 (8)
and issues a forecast f = β, where β ∈ [0, 1] is the value towards which the analyst is
biased. The payoff function in (8) could represent for example the desire of the analyst
to generate trading volume or may reflect an inherent personality trait.28 The value β
26For tractability reasons we assume that the analyst’s information is precise. Our results will hold
qualitatively if the analyst observes θ with noise.
27If q = 0, the forecast is uninformative and must be ignored by the investors. On the other hand,
if q = 1, the forecast fully reveals the state, and thus, the firm’s disclosure decision is irrelevant. Hence
we focus on the interesting case of q ∈ (0, 1).
28The payoff function in (8) is a parsimonious way to model the analyst’s forecasting bias. The
analyst’s objective could be to minimize the difference between the market price and a specific unknown
value. As we show in the next section, the market price is (weakly) increasing in the forecast, and
therefore a payoff minimizing the difference between price and a certain value is analogous to the payoff
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is unknown to the firm and the investors.29 It is distributed according to a probability
distribution function h(·) and a cumulative distribution function H(·). Let i = {U,B}
denote the analyst’s type. We refer to an analyst of type i = U as “unbiased” and to
an analyst of type i = B as “biased.”30
After observing the analyst’s forecast and the firm’s disclosure, the investors price
the firm at its expected value,
P (d, f) = E[θ × 1 + (1− θ)× 0|d, f ] = E[θ|d, f ].
As standard for disclosure models, the firm maximizes P (d, f).
The timeline of events is illustrated in Figure 1. At date 1, the analyst observes
θ. The firm observes θ with probability p. At date 3, the analyst issues a forecast.
The firm decides whether to disclose θ either at date 2 (under the “early disclosure”
scenario), or at date 4 (under the “late disclosure” scenario). At date 5, the investors
in (8).
29The value towards the analyst is biased can change over time. Thus the investors may not learn
β even in a multi-period setting.
30Our model can be applied to other contexts beyond one of corporate disclosures made in the
presence of analyst coverage. For example, it is descriptive of the incentives of a politician to voluntarily
disclose information about a political situation to a group of voters who decide about their support of
the politician’s agenda based on the voluntary disclosure and the information provided by a journalist
with an uncertain objective.
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price the firm. We first consider the timing of the firm’s disclosure as exogenously given.
That is, in Section 4, the firm either faces a late disclosure scenario (Section 4.1) or an
early disclosure scenario (Section 4.2), potentially because of the date at which the firm
observes its information or for other exogenous reason. In Section 5.1, we consider the
firm’s optimal choice of disclosure timing. In Section 5.2, we take a different approach
of considering the problem: we take the timing of the firm’s disclosure as fixed and
discuss the analyst’s optimal timing for forecast release.
2.2 Benchmark
Throughout the paper, we refer to the case without analyst coverage as the benchmark
case.31 The superscript “D” denotes the benchmark case as studied in Dye (1985).
Lemma 0. [Dye 1985 and Jung and Kwon 1988] When q = 0, there exists a unique
threshold θD ∈ (0, µ), such that the firm discloses if θ ≥ θD and withholds otherwise.
The threshold θD is decreasing in the probability of information endowment, p.
From a technical perspective, the unique threshold equilibrium arises because, while the
market price following disclosure is equal to the state θ (and thus increasing at a rate
of 1 with the state), the price following nondisclosure is constant and always between
zero and the prior mean µ.
The key insight of the Dye model is that firms are able to withhold information and
pretend to be uninformed because the market price following nondisclosure depends
on the investors’ beliefs about the firm’s information endowment. In this paper, we
show that coverage of analysts with uncertain forecasting objective affects the ability of
firms to pretend to be uninformed in two ways. First, because the forecast represents
an additional signal of the state, it directly affects the market price and thereby the
31In our setting, this case is equivalent to setting q = 0 so that the analyst is always biased and her
forecast will be ignored by the investors.
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firm’s disclosure decision. We dub this the “direct effect.” Second, the forecast affects
the investors’ beliefs about the analyst’s objective and their beliefs about the firm’s
information endowment. As we show below, these beliefs are endogenously intertwined.
As a result, the forecast indirectly affects the market price and thereby the firm’s
disclosure decision. We dub this the “indirect effect.”
3 Market price and reinforcement of beliefs
We solve the model by backward induction. At date 5, after observing the firm’s dis-
closure and the analyst’s forecast, the investors price the firm. When the firm discloses,
the market price is determined only by the disclosed value, regardless of the analyst’s
forecast, i.e.,
P (θ, f) = E[θ|θ, f ] = θ. (9)
In this case, the investors disregard the forecast because the firm learns the state pre-
cisely and, if it decides to disclose, it does so truthfully.32 When the firm remains
silent, the investors observe the lack of disclosure, d = ∅, and the forecast, f . From the
investors’ point of view, the forecast equals the state θ with probability q and equals
some unknown value β with probability 1 − q. Hence, in contrast to the benchmark
case, now the nondisclosure price is not constant but is increasing in the state θ. As
a result, it is not immediate that a threshold equilibrium even exists. In Section 4,
we establish the existence of such equilibrium under both (late and early) disclosure
scenarios. For now, we assume that a threshold equilibrium indeed exists, with some
disclosure threshold θ̂ ∈ [0, 1].33
32While the analyst also learns the state precisely, she may be biased and issue a forecast of f = β.
33In this section, we use the notation θ̂ for a generic threshold. In the following sections, we denote
the threshold in the late disclosure scenario θL and the threshold in the early disclosure scenario θE .
61
When the investors determine the firm’s price, they consider four possible events:
(1) With probability Pr(NoInf ∩ i = U |∅, θ̂, f), the firm is uninformed and the analyst
is unbiased. When the analyst is unbiased, her forecast reflects the true state.
Thus the investors’ expectation of the state in this case is simply the forecast,
E[θ|f = θ] = f .
(2) With probability Pr(NoInf ∩ i = B|∅, θ̂, f), the firm is uninformed and the analyst
is biased. Because there is nothing to learn from the firm’s nondisclosure and
from the analyst’s forecast, the investors’ expectation of the state is just the
prior, E[θ] = µ.
(3) With probability Pr(Inf ∩ i = U |∅, θ̂, f), the firm is informed and the analyst is
unbiased. As in case (1), because the analyst is unbiased, her forecast reflects the
true state. Thus the investors’ expectation of the state is E[θ|f = θ] = f .
(4) With probability Pr(Inf ∩ i = B|∅, θ̂, f), the firm is informed and the analyst is
biased. When the analyst is biased, there is nothing to learn from her forecast.
However, because the investors believe that the firm is informed, they also believe
that the firm observed θ < θ̂. Thus the investors’ expectation is E[θ|θ < θ̂].
To reduce clutter, let Λ(I, i|θ̂, f) ≡ Pr(I ∩ i|∅, θ̂, f), represent the joint probability
that the firm’s information endowment is I = {Inf ,NoInf } and the analyst’s type is i =
{U,B}, conditional on nondisclosure d = ∅, threshold θ̂ and forecast f . Summarizing
the preceding discussion, the market price in case of nondisclosure is given by:
P (∅, f |θ̂) =
(
Λ(NoInf , U |θ̂, f) + Λ(Inf , U |θ̂, f)
)
× f
+Λ(NoInf , B|θ̂, f)× µ+ Λ(Inf , B|θ̂, f)× E[θ|θ < θ̂]. (10)
It is apparent that the nondisclosure price in (10) is a weighted average of the analyst’s
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forecast f , the prior µ, and the posterior E[θ|θ < θ̂]. For comparison, the nondisclosure
price in the benchmark case is only a weighted average of the prior expectation and the
posterior expectation of the state, conditional on being below the disclosure threshold
(Dye 1985). However, as we show in detail below, the effect of an analyst with uncertain
forecasting objective goes beyond a mere addition of yet another information source.
Even though the type of the analyst is independent of the firm’s information endowment,
the beliefs of the investors about the endowment and the analyst’s type are endogenously
intertwined and reinforce each other.
To see how, let γ(θ̂) ≡ Pr(NoInf |∅, θ̂) be the probability that the firm is uninformed
in the absence of analyst coverage. Consider the two events involving the firm being
uninformed, I = NoInf ∩ i = U and I = NoInf ∩ i = B. If the investors believe that
the firm is uninformed, then the observed forecast carries no information about the
analyst’s type. Thus, Λ(NoInf , U |θ̂, f) = Pr(i = U) Pr(NoInf |∅, θ̂) = q × γ(θ̂) for any
f ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, Λ(NoInf , B|θ̂, f) = Pr(i = B) Pr(NoInf |∅, θ̂) = (1 − q) × γ(θ̂). In
summary, the probability that the event I = NoInf ∩ i = U and the probability that the
event I = NoInf ∩ i = B occur are independent of the analyst’s forecast.
When the investors believe that the firm is informed, they also infer that the firm
observed θ < θ̂ and choose to remain silent. Therefore the observed forecast carries
information about the analyst’s type. Thus the probability that the event I = Inf ∩ i =
U and the probability that the event I = Inf ∩ i = B occurs crucially depends on the
analyst’s forecast. When the investors observe a forecast that exceeds the disclosure
threshold, it will be rationally inconsistent for them to believe that the firm is informed
and the analyst is unbiased. Specifically, the probability that the analyst is unbiased,
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conditional on the the firm being informed and f > θ̂ is zero. Thus
Λ(Inf , U |θ̂, f > θ̂) = Pr(i = U |Inf , ∅, θ̂, f > θ̂) Pr(Inf |∅, θ̂, f > θ̂)
= 0× Pr(NoInf |∅, θ̂)
= 0.
On the other hand, the probability that the analyst is biased, conditional on the firm
being informed and the forecast exceeding the disclosure threshold is one. As a result,
Λ(Inf , B|θ̂, f > θ̂) = Pr(Inf |∅, θ̂) = 1− γ(θ̂)
Let us now consider the case where the analyst’s forecast is below the disclosure
threshold. Then, it is possible that the analyst is unbiased and the firm is informed.
Specifically, when the firm is informed and remains silent, the forecast is below the
disclosure threshold either because the analyst is unbiased or because the analyst is
biased but it just happened that her forecast is below the disclosure threshold. As a
result,
Λ(Inf , U |θ̂, f < θ̂) = Pr(i = U |Inf , ∅, θ̂, f < θ̂) Pr(Inf |∅, θ̂, f < θ̂)
= δ(θ̂)× (1− γ(θ̂)),
where δ(θ̂) ≡ Pr(i = U |Inf , ∅, f < θ̂) = q
q+(1−q)H(θ̂) ∈ [q, 1] is the probability that
the analyst is unbiased, conditional on the firm being informed and remaining silent,
and the forecast being below the threshold θ̂ ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, Λ(Inf , B|θ̂, f < θ̂) =
(1−δ(θ̂))×(1−γ(θ̂)). Comparing the beliefs of the investors yields the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Lower forecasts strengthen (weaken) the joint beliefs of the investors that the
firm is informed and the analyst is unbiased (biased) in the sense that: Λ(Inf, U |θ̂, f) =
1f≤θ̂ × δ(θ̂)× (1− γ(θ̂)) + (1− 1f≤θ̂)× 0 and Λ(Inf, B|θ̂, f) = 1f≤θ̂ × (1− δ(θ̂))× (1−
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γ(θ̂)) + (1− 1f≤θ̂)× (1− γ(θ̂)).
Going back to the nondisclosure price in (10), and comparing it with the bench-
mark case, we note that analyst coverage with uncertain forecasting objective not only
shifts weight from the prior µ and the posterior E[θ|θ ≤ θ̂] to the forecast f but also
redistributes the relative weights on µ and E[θ|θ ≤ θ̂]. To illustrate this effect suppose
that the forecast is below the disclosure threshold, i.e., f ≤ θ̂. This is a case in which
the investors cannot rule out that the analyst is unbiased, regardless of their beliefs
about the firm’s information endowment. Then, by Lemma 1, the relative weight on
the prior µ is larger than the weight on the posterior E[θ|θ ≤ θ̂] < µ (as compared to
these weights under the benchmark case). Now suppose that the forecast is above the
disclosure threshold. As already noted, to hold consistent beliefs, the investors cannot
simultaneously believe the forecast is unbiased and the firm is informed. Then, by
Lemma 1, the relative weight on the prior µ is lower than the weight on the posterior
E[θ|θ ≤ θ̂] < µ (as compared to the benchmark case).
To gain further intuition about the driving forces behind our result, let us focus on
the beliefs of the investors that the analyst is unbiased.
Lemma 2. The investors’ beliefs that the analyst is unbiased are Pr(i = U |NoInf , ∅, θ̂) =
q and Pr(i = U |Inf , ∅, θ̂) = 1f≤θ̂ × δ(θ̂) + (1− 1f≤θ̂)× 0, where δ(θ̂) ≥ q.
Our result is graphically illustrated in Figure 2. If the investors believe that the firm is
uninformed, then their beliefs regarding the analyst’s objective remain at the prior level
Pr(i = B) = q, regardless of the forecast. However, if the investors believe that the
firm is informed and did not disclose, they infer that the state is below the disclosure
threshold (because the investors are aware of the firm’s disclosure strategy). Then,
if the analyst forecasts a value that is above the disclosure threshold, the investors
conclude that the forecast cannot reflect the true state and allocate a probability of
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Figure 2: Investors’ beliefs that the analyst is unbiased
Numerical example with uniform distributions of θ and β, p = 0.6 and q = 0.4.
0 that the analyst is unbiased.34 If the analyst forecasts a value that is below the
disclosure threshold, the investors conclude that the probability for the forecast to be
unbiased is γ(θ̂) > q. In other words, the investors update upwards their beliefs that
the analyst is unbiased. The following corollary follows immediately:
Corollary 2. Regardless of the value β towards which the analyst may be biased, the
investors are always more skeptical about forecasts reflecting high values.
Regardless of the investors’ beliefs about the firm’s information endowment, analyst’s
forecasts above the disclosure threshold are considered to be (weakly) more biased.
Surprisingly, this happens even when the analysts are biased towards the lowest possible
value β = 0. This is because the investors’ skepticism is not driven by the direction of
the analysts’ bias, rather by how their forecasts compare with the equilibrium disclosure
threshold of the firm.
Another way of thinking about the effect of analysts’ forecasts is by describing how
the realization of f affects the investors’ beliefs about the firm’s information endowment,
34To hold consistent beliefs, the investors cannot believe that the forecast truthfully reflects a state
exceeding the disclosure threshold and that the firm is informed and remained silent.
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Pr(NoInf |∅, θ̂, f).
Lemma 3. Forecasts below (above) the disclosure threshold weakens (strengthens) the
investors’ beliefs that the firm is uninformed, i.e., Pr(NoInf |∅, θ̂, f < θE) < Pr(NoInf |∅, θ̂) <
Pr(NoInf |∅, θ̂, f > θE).
To understand the intuition behind our result, consider the case where the firm remains
silent and the analyst forecasts a value that is below the disclosure threshold. Then,
the investors believe that it is more likely that the analyst is unbiased and forecasted
the true state. This, in turn, reinforces the investors’ beliefs that the firm is informed
but did not disclose. And vice versa: a forecast above the disclosure threshold is
perceived to be more biased. Therefore it strengthens the investors’ beliefs that the
firm is uninformed. Put differently, the forecast “reinforces” the investors’ beliefs about
the firm’s information endowment—if the investors believe that the analyst is biased
(unbiased), they also believe that the firm is less (more) likely to be informed. This
effect, which we label the “reinforcement effect” of forecasts, plays a significant role in
our analysis.
4 Firm’s voluntary disclosure
4.1 Late disclosure
We begin with the case where the analyst releases her forecast before the firm has an
opportunity to disclose. In this scenario, the firm, if informed, can respond at date 4
to the analyst’s forecast by disclosing the observed value θ (“late disclosure”). We first
the existence of a unique threshold equilibrium that depends on the forecast f . The
superscript “L” denotes late disclosure.
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Proposition 1. For any forecast f ∈ [0, 1] there exists a threshold θL ∈ (0, 1), such
that the informed firm responds if θ ≥ θL and remains silent otherwise.
Our result suggests that firms observing states above θL “correct” biased forecasts,
while the rest remain silent—even if, or perhaps because, the forecast does not reflect
the true state.35
To understand the intuition behind our result, note that the firm compares the price
following disclosure, as defined in (9), with the price following nondisclosure, as defined
in (10) for a threshold θ̂ = θL. Importantly, for a given forecast f , the price in (10) is
constant. In addition, because of the investors’ uncertainty regarding the analyst’s type
and the weight put on the prior expectation, the nondisclosure price is above 0 even
when f = 0 and below 1 even when f = 1. Therefore a unique threshold equilibrium
arises such that the price following disclosure of θ = θL equals the nondisclosure price
P (∅, f |θL). Put differently, because of their uncertainty about the analyst’s forecasting
objective, the investors are skeptical about the forecast accuracy and assign a non-zero
probability that the analyst is biased. Thus, the market price differs from the released
forecast. Firms observing low market demand benefit from this uncertainty because:
(i) unbiased forecasts are given a low weight in the price formation and (ii) biased
forecasts are likely more favorable than the true state. Thus firms observing relatively
low θ prefer to remain silent. And vice versa for firms observing high θ—they do not
benefit from the investors’ uncertainty and prefer to respond.
Proposition 2. The late disclosure threshold θL is decreasing in the probability of
information endowment, p. There exists a cutoff fL ∈ (0, µ), such that, if f < fL,
the late threshold θL is decreasing in the probability q that the analyst is unbiased. If
f > fL, the late disclosure threshold θL is increasing in q.
35Technically, the threshold depends on f . We suppress it to reduce clutter.
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Figure 3: The late disclosure threshold θL as a function of q
Numerical example with uniform distributions of θ and β, and p = 0.6.
The comparative statics of the late disclosure threshold with respect to the proba-
bility that the firm is endowed with information is straightforward: the higher p is, the
harder it is for an informed firm to pretend to be uninformed. As a result, the firm
discloses more often. The comparative statics with respect to q, depend on the forecast.
When it is more likely that the analyst is unbiased, the investors put a greater weight
on the forecast. Thus, the higher the forecast, the higher the nondisclosure price. As
a result, the late disclosure threshold goes up. The opposite is true when the forecast
is low. Then the nondisclosure price is lower which leads to a threshold decrease. Our
result is formally stated in Proposition 2 and graphically illustrated in Figure 3.
A natural question that arises is whether the coverage by analysts with uncertain
forecasting objective suppresses firms’ disclosure.
Corollary 3. There exists a cutoff f o ∈ (0, θD) such that θL < θD if f < f o and
θL > θD if f > f o
Our result is graphically illustrated in Figure 4. The firm responds to unfavorable
forecasts (f < f o) by disclosing values that would have been withheld in the absence
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Figure 4: Comparison of θD and θL
Numerical example with uniform distributions of θ and β, and p = 0.6 and q = 0.4.
Here, fo = 0.29 and θD = 0.31.
of analyst coverage. Furthermore, following favorable forecasts (f > f o), the firm
withholds values that would have been disclosed in the absence of analyst coverage. Put
differently, as one would expect, unfavorable forecasts encourage corporate disclosure,
whereas favorable ones discourage disclosure. Interestingly, we find that, even when the
analyst forecasts a value that equals precisely the benchmark threshold (f = θD), the
disclosure threshold with analyst coverage still exceeds the benchmark one. We interpret
this last observation as a manifestation of crowding-out effect of analyst coverage with
uncertain forecasting objective.
An interesting question to ask is which forecasts induce the firm’s response. It seems
intuitive that firms respond only to negatively biased forecasts. Our next result shows
that this intuition is not always correct.
Corollary 4. There exists a cutoff f ∈ (0, µ), such that θL > f if f < f and θL < f if
f > f .
If the forecast is sufficiently negatively biased (f < f), then the disclosure threshold
exceeds it (θL > f); i.e., the firm withholds values that are more favorable than the
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Figure 5: Late disclosure of unfavorable news and withholding of favorable news
Numerical example with uniform distributions of θ and β, p = 0.6 and q = 0.4. Here, f = 0.35.
ones forecasted by the analyst. And vice versa: if the forecast is sufficiently positively
biased (f > f), the disclosure threshold falls short of it (θL < f); i.e., the firm discloses
values that are less favorable than the ones forecasted by the analyst. This result is
graphically illustrated in Figure 7.
Our result may seem perplexing: why would anyone withhold favorable news but
reveal unfavorable news? The answer to this question lies in the way the investors
react to statements made by analysts with uncertain forecasting objective. To fix ideas,
suppose that the analyst is unbiased and forecasts exactly what the firm observes, i.e.,
f = θ. Even though the analyst in this case is unbiased, the investors are uncertain
about her type and the firm’s information endowment. As a result, the price is a
weighted average of the forecast, the prior µ, and the expected state, given that it is
below the threshold. Hence the price has a sensitivity to the forecast that is strictly
lower than 1. More importantly, because of the mean reversion, low forecasts lead to
prices that exceed them, whereas high forecasts lead to prices that fall short of them.
The result of Corollary 4 arises because, in equilibrium, the late disclosure threshold
is equal to the price following nondisclosure. Note that the switching point is strictly
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below the mean µ because a nonzero weight is given to the expected project value,
conditional on it being below the news, which is strictly lower than the prior.
4.2 Early disclosure
We continue with the analysis of the firm’s voluntary disclosure under the early disclo-
sure scenario. Because the firm’s disclosure at date 2 precedes the analyst’s forecast
at date 3, the firm must decide whether to disclose or not without observing f . Thus
the firm needs to form an expectation of the nondisclosure price, given the state it
observed. Formally, the firm’s expectation of the market price upon nondisclosure is
Ef [P (∅, f |θ̂)]|θ], where Ef [·|θ] is the expectation taken by the firm over f , given the
observed θ and a threshold θ̂:
Ef [P (f, ∅|θ̂)]|θ] = Pr(i = U |θ)× Ef [E[θ|∅, θ̂, f ]|i = U, θ]
+ Pr(i = B|θ)× Ef [E[θ|∅, θ̂, f ]|i = B, θ].
Because the forecast is not released yet, the observation of θ by the firm carries
no information about the analyst’s type. Thus Pr(i = U |θ) = Pr(i = U) = q.
Furthermore, the firm expects that forecasts made by unbiased analysts will reflect
θ, i.e., Ef [E[θ|∅, θ̂, f ]|i = U, θ] = Ef [E[θ|∅, θ̂, f ]|f = θ, θ]. Hence, with probabil-
ity q the expected nondisclosure price is P (∅, f = θ|θ̂). Similarly, with probability
Pr(i = B|θ) = Pr(i = B) = 1 − q, the firm expects that the analyst is biased and her
forecast will equal β, i.e., Ef [E[θ|∅, θ̂, f ]|i = B, θ] = Ef [E[θ|∅, θ̂, f ]|f = β, θ]. It turns
out that the expected nondisclosure price in this case is additively separable in the price
that would prevail in the absence of analyst coverage, P (∅|θ̂), and an additional term
that reflects the difference in the distributions of the state θ and the value β towards
which analysts type i = B are biased..
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Lemma 4. The expected nondisclosure price is given by Ef [P (∅, f |θ̂)]|θ] = q×P (∅, f =
θ|θ̂) + (1 − q) ×
(
P (∅|θ̂) + R(∆,∆(θ̂))
)
, where R(·) is an increasing function of ∆ ≡
E[β]− E[θ] and ∆(θ̂) ≡ E[β|β < θ̂]− E[θ|θ < θ̂].
If analysts type i = B are more likely to be biased towards forecasting high values
(as compared to the distribution of the true state) the nondisclosure price is affected
positively. And vice versa, if analysts are more likely to be biased towards low values,
the nondisclosure price is affected negatively. Our next corollary follows immediately.
Corollary 5. First-order stochastically dominance of h(·) over g(·) has a positive effect
on the expected nondisclosure price.
In the special case where β is distributed exactly as θ, the informed firm, when
deciding whether to disclose, considers only the effect of forecasts made by unbiased
analysts.
Corollary 6. Suppose that the uncertain bias β is distributed according to the same
distribution as the state θ, i.e., h(·) = g(·). Then, when deciding whether to disclose
an observed value, the firm disregards the effect that forecasts made by biased analysts
have on the expected nondisclosure price.
The reason behind our result is that, when h(·) = g(·), the expectations of β and θ
conditional on being below any value are identical. Thus ∆ = 0 and ∆ = 0 so that
Ef [E[θ|∅, θ̂, f ]|f 6= θ, θ] = E[θ|∅, θ̂] = P (∅|θ̂), which is independent of f . Put differently,
in this special case, forecasts released by biased analysts act as noise and “wash out” in
expectation. Hence only forecasts made by unbiased analysts affect the firm’s disclosure
decision.
We are now ready to formally establish the existence of a unique threshold equilib-
rium under the early disclosure scenario (superscript “E”).
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Proposition 3. There exists a unique threshold θE ∈ (0, 1), such that an informed firm
discloses the observed state if θ ≥ θE and withholds it otherwise.
When deciding whether to disclose, an informed firm compares the price in case of
disclosure with its expectation of the price in case of nondisclosure. As before, the
price following disclosure, P (θ, f) = θ, is increasing in the observed state. However,
in contrast to the benchmark case and the late disclosure scenario, for given investors’
beliefs about the threshold strategy θ̂ = θE , the firm’s expectation of the price in case of
nondisclosure, Ef [P (∅, f |θE ]|θ], is not constant—it is also increasing in θ. Nevertheless,
as our result in Proposition 3 formally establishes, a threshold equilibrium continues to
exist in the early disclosure scenario.
First, while the disclosure price increases at a rate of ∂
∂θ
P (θ, f) = 1, the expected
nondisclosure price (for a given threshold) increases at a rate of ∂
∂θ
Ef [P (∅, f |θE ]|θ] < 1.
The reason is that, for a given conjectured disclosure threshold, the expected price
following nondisclosure depends on the state only through the forecast whenever it is
released by an unbiased analyst. Even when the analyst is unbiased, the investors
are skeptical and assign a positive probability that the analyst is biased (as long as
q < 1). As a result, as shown in (10), the price following nondisclosure is a weighted
average of the forecast, the prior mean, and the expected state, given it is below the
conjectured threshold. Hence the sensitivity to the forecast is strictly below 1. Second,
and perhaps more important, the expected nondisclosure price when f = 0 is strictly
above 0, whereas that following f = 1 is strictly below 1. These observations ensure
the existence of a unique threshold equilibrium.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the uncertain bias β is distributed according to the same
distribution as the state θ, i.e., h(·) = g(·). Then, the threshold θE is decreasing in the
probability that the firm is endowed with information, p, and increasing in the probability
that the analyst is unbiased, q.
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Not surprisingly, the disclosure threshold θE is decreasing in the probability p that
the firm is endowed with information. As before, the higher p is, the higher are the
beliefs of the investors that the firm is informed but chose to withhold its information.
Hence the lower the weight the investors place on the prior expectation µ and the
higher the weight they place on the expected state, conditional on being below the
threshold θE (this expectation is strictly lower than the prior µ). As a result, the
expected nondisclosure price is lower, which drives the equilibrium disclosure threshold
down and the firm discloses more often.
The comparative statics of the threshold θE with respect to q is driven by the fact
that the more likely it is that the analyst is unbiased, the more weight is shifted to the
forecast f away from the prior expectation µ and the posterior expectation given that
the state is below the threshold θE . By Corollary 6, when the state θ and the bias β
are distributed according to the same distribution, h(·) = g(·), the firm only considers
unbiased forecasts. When selecting the equilibrium threshold, the firm focuses on the
forecast that equals the threshold θE , which, for h(·) = g(·), is below the prior µ. Thus
shifting weight away from µ reduces the nondisclosure price and thereby the equilibrium
disclosure threshold. However, this is more than outweighed by the opposite effect
occurring because weight is shifted away from the posterior E[θ|θ < θE ].
A natural next step is to consider how (potentially biased) forecasts affect the like-
lihood of voluntary disclosure. Given that, for a given disclosure threshold θ̂, the
probability of disclosure is p(1−G(θ̂)), it is enough to compare θE with the benchmark
θD.
Proposition 5. Suppose that the uncertain bias β is distributed according to the same
distribution as the state θ, i.e., h(·) = g(·). Then, analyst coverage suppresses voluntary
disclosures, i.e., θE − θD ≥ 0. The more likely that the analyst is unbiased, the stronger
the suppression effect, i.e., ∂
∂q
(θE − θD) > 0.
75
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.37
0.38
0.39
0.40
0.41
0.42
q
θE
θD
Figure 6: Illustration of the crowding-out effect of analyst coverage
Numerical example with uniform distributions of θ and β, and p = 0.6. Note that in the benchmark
case there is no analyst coverage and therefore the disclosure threshold θD is independent of q.
Our result is graphically illustrated in Figure 4. All types that withhold under the
benchmark continue to withhold in the presence of analyst coverage. However, when
facing analyst coverage, firms observing states θ ∈ [θD, θE ] also withhold their informa-
tion. Thus we predict that analyst coverage crowds out voluntary disclosure.
Our result implies that some firms are better off when their information is forecasted
by a potentially biased analyst, rather than when they directly disclose it. The impetus
for this result is the investors’ uncertainty about the analyst forecasting objective and
the firm’s information endowment. Specifically, if the investors believe the forecast is
unbiased, they react the same way as they would have reacted if the firm were to disclose
the information. However, because of the reinforcement effect, if they believe that the
forecast is biased, the investors assign a higher likelihood that the firm is uninformed
and hence put greater weight on the prior µ.36 Hence some firms observing values below
the prior µ benefit from relying on the analyst to forecast those values.
36If the forecast is biased, the firm is more likely to be uninformed.
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5 Strategic choice of timing
Until now we considered the timing of the corporate disclosures and the analysts forecast
as exogenously given. We now discuss the strategic consideration of the players related
to the timing of their actions.
5.1 The optimal timing of firm’s disclosure
In this subsection, we consider the optimal timing of disclosure from the firm’s per-
spective. If, at date 1, the firm observes θ > limf→1 θL, then the firm is indifferent
between making its disclosure decision early or late.37 This is because, in either case,
the firm ends up disclosing and the price equals the observed state. However, for any
observed value θ ∈ [θE , limf→1 θL] the firm prefers to delay the disclosure decision. This
is because, by delaying, the firm may end up withholding the observed value (if, at
date 4, this value is below θL). The equilibrium market price following nondisclosure
is higher than the observed value. Thus the firm can only benefit from the delay. Our
discussion is summarized below.
Corollary 7. Suppose h(·) = g(·). Firms observing favorable information can only
benefit from delaying their disclosure decision.
How about firms observing unfavorable market demand information? Clearly, a
firm observing θ < θE has nothing to disclose at date 2. When the firm cannot credibly
commit that it has nothing to disclose at date 2, it has no choice but remain silent. By
doing so, it may end up benefiting or losing. Specifically, if θL < θ < θE , the firm will
have to disclose at date 4 and end up with a market price that is strictly lower than the
one achievable in the early disclosure regime. On the other hand, if θL > θE > θ, the
37Note that since θE is set in expectation over f (conditional on θ), it has to be the case that
θE ≤ limf→1 θL.
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firm will remain silent also at date 4 and will be lumped together with higher types,
thereby obtaining a higher market price. Given that in expectation E[θE ] = θL, the firm
observing unfavorable information should be indifferent. Future research will explore
how the ability to commit to nondisclosure at date 2 changes the strategic choice of
firms observing unfavorable information. Of specific interest is how early commitment
to nondisclosure affects the investors’ beliefs about the firm’s information endowment.
5.2 The optimal timing of forecast release by a biased analyst
In this subsection, we discuss a variation of our model where the corporate disclosure
timing is fixed but the analyst can choose the timing of her forecast. An unbiased
analyst aiming to issue as precise as possible forecast is indifferent about when the
forecast is released. However, this may not be the case for a biased analyst. Until now
we were a bit casual about the source of analyst’s bias and only pointed out in footnote
28 that the biased analyst’s objective could be to minimize the difference between the
market price and a specific unknown value. Such objective could be represented by:
piB = −(P (d, f)−m(β))2,
where m(β) represents the market price level towards which the analyst is biased and,
as before, β is the analyst’s unknown bias. As already discussed, the market price in
case of disclosure is P (θ, f) = θ so that the biased analyst has no way of maximizing her
payoff. Thus the objective of a biased analyst boils down to (i) preempting the firm’s
disclosure and (ii) issuing a forecast that satisfies P (∅, f) = m(β). Because the biased
analyst knows her (biased) forecast and thus the late disclosure threshold, the choice
of forecast timing to preempt corporate disclosure can be simplified to comparison of
the late disclosure threshold θL, with the early disclosure threshold θE .
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Corollary 8. Suppose h(·) = g(·). There exists a cutoff βdelay ∈ (0, µ), such that only
analysts with bias β < βdelay delay their forecasts.
While θE is set in expectation over f (and is thereby constant), θL is set for a given
forecast and is increasing in f . If the biased analyst expects to forecast f = β below the
cutoff βdelay, the threshold under the early disclosure scenario, exceeds the one under
the late disclosure scenario. Then, all else equal, delaying the forecast maximizes the
probability that the firm will remain silent and the analyst will be able to maximize
her payoff.
6 Empirical predictions
In the remainder of the paper, we discuss several implications of our late disclosure
scenario that can help explain the empirical evidence about the association between
stock price declines and corporate disclosures of (relatively) favorable information as
well as the association between stock price increases and firm’s disclosure of (relatively)
unfavorable news. We slightly deviate from our assumption that the investors price
the firm only at date 5 and assume instead that they set a price after the arrival of
every piece of information, i.e., at dates 3 and 2 (with early disclosure) or 4 (with late
disclosure).38
To fix ideas, let Pt denote the price at date t. Initially, the price before any infor-
mation arrives is P1 = E[θ] = µ. Immediately after observing the forecast and before
any response (or lack thereof) by the firm, the price is P3(f) = E[θ|f ] = qf + (1− q)µ.
Note that, depending on whether the forecast is above or below the prior mean, the
38This change in assumption does not affect our results qualitatively but allows us to track the
market price after the arrival of every piece of information, as is typical in stock markets.
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price at date 3 may be above or below the initial price, i.e.,
P1 < P3(f)⇔ f > µ.
Hence, as one would expect, favorable news increase the price, and unfavorable news—
decrease it.
At date 4, the price depends on whether the firm responds. If it does, the price is
P4(f, v) = θ; otherwise, the price is P4(f, ∅) = P (∅, f |θL), as defined in (10).
Corollary 9. The price following no-response to the forecast always decreases, i.e.,
P4(f, ∅) < P3(f) for any f . The price following a response may decrease or increase,
depending on the value reported in the news, i.e., P4(f, v) < P3(f)⇔ f > v−(1−q)µq .
Our result implies that, as one would expect, when the firm does not respond to the
forecast, the price decreases. This is because, when the firm does not respond, the
investors conclude that there is a chance the firm observed an even lower value. How-
ever, the price may also decrease when the firm responds. The impetus for this result
is that, after the forecast, the firm anticipates a further decrease in the price if it does
not respond. To avoid this, it responds by disclosing values that, while lower than the
price from date 3, exceed the price that would have prevailed if it had remained silent.
Our results in this subsection may explain the empirical evidence consistent with
price increases following unfavorable information arrival and price decreases following
favorable information. Relatedly, Sletten (2011) shows that, in response to unfavorable
external news, firms disclose information. While in most cases, following the corporate
disclosure, stock price increases, in some cases the price decreases.
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7 Concluding Remarks
We study the interaction between corporate disclosures and forecasts issued by analysts
with uncertain forecasting objective. We find that analyst coverage may suppress volun-
tary disclosure when the latter happens before or simultaneously with the release of the
news. Otherwise, when the disclosure occurs in response to the forecast, the firm may
reveal information that is less favorable than the analyst’s forecast but withhold more
favorable information. Our results shed light on the empirical evidence about stock
price decreases following favorable exogenous news and stock price increases following
unfavorable news. Future work may consider background communication between firms
and analysts.
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Appendix C - Proofs
Proof of Lemma 0: Follows directly from the proof in Dye (1985) and Jung and Kwon
(1998) and is omitted. For future reference, the threshold θD satisfies θD = Pr(NoInf|d =
∅, θD) · µ+ (1− Pr(NoInf|d = ∅, θD)) · E[θ|θ ≤ θD]. 
Proof of Lemma 1: The proof follows directly from the discussion in the text and is
omitted. 
Proof of Lemma 2: The proof follows from the arguments leading to Lemma 1. 
Proof of Corollary 2: The proof follows from the fact that for any θ̂ < 1 we get
q < δ(θ̂) = q
q+(1−q)H(θ̂) . Furthermore, if θ̂ = 1 we get q = δ(θ̂) =
q
q+(1−q)H(θ̂) . Lastly,
0 < δ(θ̂) = q
q+(1−q)H(θ̂) . (Recall that q > 0, by assumption.) Note that all expressions
above are independent of β. 
Proof of Lemma 3: First, we note that Pr(NoInf |∅, θ̂, f) = 1− Pr(Inf ∩ θ < θ̂|∅, θ̂, f).
Furthermore,
Pr(Inf ∩ θ < θ̂|∅, θ̂, f < θ̂) = pG(θ̂)
1− p+ pG(θ̂)
+
qp(1− p)(1−H(θ̂))
1− p+ pG(θ̂)
> Pr(Inf ∩ θ < θ̂|∅, θ̂).
Furthermore,
Pr(Inf ∩ θ < θ̂|∅, θ̂, f > θ̂) = (1− q) pG(θ̂)
1− p+ pG(θ̂)
< Pr(Inf ∩ θ < θ̂|∅, θ̂).
Combining our observations yields the result. 
Proof of Proposition 1: Since f is fixed, for any (assumed) threshold θL the price
upon nondisclosure, is constant while the price upon disclosure increases in the disclosed
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value, thus a threshold equilibrium may exist. The equilibrium condition is
NL(θL, f) = P (∅, f |θL)− P (θ = θL, f)
= γ(θL)µ+ (1− γ(θL))E[θ|θ ≤ θL] + γ(θL)q(f − µ)
+(1− γ(θL))δ(θL)(f − E[θ|θ ≤ θL])− θL
= 0
We note that NL(·) is decreasing in θL and that limθL→0NL(·) = µ + q(f − µ) > 0,
whereas limθL→1NL(·) = (1−p)µ+pµ+ (1−p)q(f −µ) +pq(f −µ)−1 < 0. Therefore
a unique threshold equilibrium exists, whereby the conjectured disclosure threshold
θL ∈ (0, 1) is correct. 
Proof of Proposition 2: Using the proof of Proposition 1 and the Implicit Function
Theorem,
d
dp
θL ∝ ∂
∂p
NL(·) ∝ (1− δ(θL))E[θ|θ ≤ θL]− (1− q)µ < 0,
because E[θ|θ ≤ θL] < µ and 1− δ(θL) < 1− q. Furthermore,
d
dq
θL ∝ ∂
∂q
NL(·) = γ(θL)(f − µ) + (1− γ(θL)) ∂
∂q
δ(θL)(f − E[θ|θ ≤ θD]) ≡ nL(f).
We note that nL(f) is increasing in f , limf→0 nL(f) < 0 and limf→µ nL(f) > 0. Hence,
there exists a cutoff fL ∈ (0, µ) such that θL is increasing in q if f > fL and decreasing
in q if f < fL. 
Proof of Corollary 3: By the proof of Proposition 1, the threshold θL satisfies
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NL(θL, f) = 0. By the proof of Lemma 0, the threshold θD satisfies
γ(θD)µ+ (1− γ(θD)E[θ|θ ≤ θD]− θD = 0. (11)
To show that θD > θL (θD < θL) it is enough to show that NL(θD, f) < 0 (NL(θD, f) >
0). Using (11), we get
NL(θD, f) = γ(θD)q(f − µ) + (1− γ(θD))δ(θD)(f − E[θ|θ ≤ θD])
We note that NL(·) is monotonically increasing in f . Furthermore, limf→0NL(·) < 0,
whereas
lim
f→θD
NL(·) = γ(θD)q(θD − µ) + (1− γ(θD))δ(θD)(θD − E[θ|θ ≤ θD])
= γ(θD)qθD − γ(θD)qµ+ (1− γ(θD))δ(θD)θD
−(1− γ(θD))δ(θD)E[θ|θ ≤ θD]
−(1− γ(θD))qE[θ|θ ≤ θD] + (1− γ(θD))qE[θ|θ ≤ θD]
= θD(γ(·)q + (1− γ(·))δ(·))− q (γ(·)µ+ (1− γ(·))E[θ|θ ≤ θD])︸ ︷︷ ︸
=θD
−(1− γ(·))E[θ|θ ≤ θD](δ(·)− q)
= θD(1− γ(·))(δ(·)− q)− (1− γ(·))(δ(·)− q)E[θ|θ ≤ θD]
∝ θD − E[θ|θ ≤ θD]
> 0.
Thus we conclude that there exists f o ∈ (0, θD), such that θD > θL when f < f o and
θD < θL when f > f o. 
Proof of Corollary 4: From the proof of Proposition 1 we know that θL satisfies:
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NL(θL, f) = 0. Using the Implicit Function Theorem, dθ
L
df
= −
∂NL(·)
∂f
∂NL(·)
∂θL
∝ ∂NL(·)
∂f
< 0.
Because for f = 0 we get that θL > 0 and for f = µ we get that θL < µ, then there
exist f ∈ (0, µ) such that θL = f and for any f < f we get that f < θL and vice versa
for f < f . 
Proof of Lemma 4: Using (10) and Lemma 1, the price following nondisclosure can
be expressed as:
P (∅, f |θ̂) = (1− q)γ(·)× µ+ (1− γ(·))(1− τ)× E[θ|θ < θ̂] +
(
γ(·)q + (1− γ(·))τ
)
× f,
where τ = 1f<θδ(·). The expected nondisclosure price is equal to
Ef [P (∅, f |θ̂)|θ] = Pr(i = U)P (∅, f = θ|θ̂) + Pr(i = B)Ef [P (∅, f |θ̂)|θ, f = β].
Let us focus on Ef [P (∅, f |θ̂)|θ, f = β]. When taking expectation we have to consider
two cases:
Case (i): The biased forecast happens to be below the threshold ⇒ f = β < θ̂;
Case (ii): The biased forecast happens to be above the threshold ⇒ f = β > θ̂.
Thus we can express
Ef [P (∅, f |θ̂)|f 6= θ, θ] = Pr(f < θ̂|f 6= θ)× φ+ Pr(f > θ̂|f 6= θ)× φ,
where
φ ≡ (1− q)γ(·)× µ+ (1− γ(·))(1− δ(·))× E[θ|θ < θ̂]
+
(
γ(·)q + (1− γ(·))δ(·)
)
× E[f |f = β < θ],
φ ≡ (1− q)γ(·)× µ+ (1− γ(·))× E[θ|θ < θ̂] + γ(·)q × E[f |f = β > θ].
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Noting that Pr(f < θ̂|f 6= θ) = H(θ̂) and Pr(f > θ̂|f 6= θ) = 1−H(θ̂) and rearranging,
Ef [P (∅, f |θ̂)|f 6= θ, θ] = (1− q)γ(·)× µ
+γ(·)q
(
H(θ̂)E[β|β < θ] + (1−H(θ̂))E[β|β > θ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=E[β]
)
+(1− γ(·))
(
H(θ̂)(1− δ(·)) + 1−H(θ̂)
)
× E[θ|θ < θ̂]
+(1− γ(·))δ(·)H(θ̂)E[β|β < θ̂].
Simplifying and rearranging,
Ef [P (∅, f |θ̂)|f 6= θ, θ] = γ(·)µ+ (1− γ(·))E[θ|θ < θ̂]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=P (∅|θ̂)
+R(∆,∆(θ̂)),
where R(∆,∆(θ̂)) ≡ γ(·)q∆ + (1 − γ(·))δ(·)H(θ̂)∆(θ̂), ∆ ≡ E[β] − E[θ] and ∆(θ̂) ≡
E[β|β < θ̂]− E[θ|θ < θ̂]. Combining our observations yields the result. 
Proof of Corollary 5: Follows immediately from the discussion in the main text. 
Proof of Corollary 6: Follows immediately from the discussion in the main text. 
Proof of Proposition 3: Using Lemma 4, we can express the equilibrium condition
as:
NE(θE) ≡ q × P (∅, f = θ|θ̂) + (1− q)×
(
P (∅|θ̂) +R(∆,∆(θ̂))
)
− θE = 0.
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Rearranging,
NE(θE) =
q
(
(1− q)γ(·)µ+ (1− γ(·))(1− δ(·))E[θ|θ < θE ] +
(
γ(·)q + (1− γ(·))δ(·)
)
θE
)
+(1− q)
(
γ(·)µ+ (1− γ(·))E[θ|θ < θE ] + γ(·)q∆ + (1− γ(·))δ(·)H(θE)∆(θE)
)
−θE
Simplifying,
NE(θE) = γ(·)µ+ (1− γ(·))E[θ|θ < θE ] + q2(θE − µ)γ(·)
+qδ(·)(1− γ(·))(θE − E[θ|θ < θE ])
+(1− q)qγ(·)∆ + (1− q)(1− γ(·))δ(·)H(θE)∆(θE)
We observe that NE(θE) is decreasing in θE and that
lim
θE→0
NE(θE) = µ− q2µ+ (1− q)q∆ = (1− q)(µ+ qE[β]) > 0
lim
θE→1
NE(θE) = (1− p)µ+ pµ+ q2(1− µ)(1− p)
+q2p(1− µ) + (1− q)q(1− p)∆ + (1− q)pq∆− 1
= µ+ q2(1− µ) + q(1− q)∆− 1
= (1− q)µ+ q2(1− E[β])− 1
< (1− q)µ+ q2 − 1 < 0.
Thus, there exists a unique threshold, θE ∈ (0, 1), such that NE(θE) = 0. Any type
observing θ < θE is strictly better off withholding and any type observing θ > θE is
strictly better off disclosing. 
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Proof of Proposition 4: Using the proof of Proposition 3, the disclosure threshold
θE is defined by NE(θE) = 0, where NE(·) is a decreasing function. Hence, using the
Implicit Function Theorem, dθ
E
dp
= −
∂NE (·)
∂p
∂NE (·)
∂θE
∝ ∂NE(·)
∂p
and dθ
E
dq
= −
∂NE (·)
∂q
∂NE (·)
∂θE
∝ ∂NE(·)
∂q
. We
note that when g(·) = h(·), we have θE < µ. It is easy to verify that
∂NE(·)
∂p
=
∂
∂p
(
1− p
1− p+ pG(θE)
)
(1− q2)(µ− θE)
+
∂
∂p
(
pG(θ̂)
1− p+ pG(θE)
)(
1− q
2
q + (1− q)G(θE)
)(
E[θ|θ ≤ θE ]− θE)
= − G(θ
E)
(1− p+ pG(θE))2 (1− q
2)(µ− θE)
+
G(θE)
(1− p+ pG(θE))2
(
1− q
2
q + (1− q)G(θE)
)(
E[θ|θ ≤ θE ]− θE)
∝ −(1− q2)(µ− θE)−
(
1− q
2
q + (1− q)G(θE)
)(
θE − E[θ|θ ≤ θE ]) < 0.
Hence, dθ
E
dp
< 0. Furthermore,
∂NE(·)
∂q
=
∂
∂q
(1− q2)
(
1− p
1− p+ pG(θE)
)
(µ− θE)
+
∂
∂q
(
1− q
2
q + (1− q)G(θE)
)(
pG(θE)
1− p+ pG(θE)
)(
E[θ|θ ≤ θE ]− θE) .
We can restate the equilibrium condition as:
(
1− p
1− p+ pG(θE)
)
(µ− θE) =
(
pG(θE)
1− p+ pG(θE)
)(
θE − E[θ|θ ≤ θE ])(1− q2q+(1−q)G(θE)
1− q2
)
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Substituting,
∂NE(·)
∂q
=
∂
∂q
(1− q2)
(
pG(θE)
1− p+ pG(θE)
)(
θE − E[θ|θ ≤ θE ])(1− q2q+(1−q)G(θE)
1− q2
)
− ∂
∂q
(
1− q
2
q + (1− q)G(θE)
)(
pG(θE)
1− p+ pG(θE)
)(
θE − E[θ|θ ≤ θE ])
∝ −2q
(
1− q2
q+(1−q)G(θE)
1− q2
)
+
q(q −G(θE)(q − 2))
(q + (1− q)G(θE))2
∝ −2(q + (1− q)G(θE))2 + 2q2(q + (1− q)G(θE))
+(1− q2)(q(1−G(θE)) + 2G(θE))
= 2(q + (1− q)G(θE))(−(1− q)q − (1− q)G(θE))
+(1− q)(1 + q)(q(1−G(θE)) + 2G(θE))
∝ −2(q + (1− q)G(θE))(q +G(θE)) + (1 + q)(q(1−G(θE)) + 2G(θE)) > 0
because 0 < q < 1 and 0 < G(θE) < 1. Hence, dθ
E
dq
> 0. 
Proof of Proposition 5: Taking into account that θD = (1−p)µ+pG(θ
D)E[θ|θ≤θD]
1−p+pG(θD) , and
using the proof of Proposition 3,
NE(θD) ∝ (1− p)(1− q2)(µ− θD)
+pG(θD)
(
1− q
2
q + (1− q)G(θD)
)(
E[θ|θ ≤ θD]− θD)
∝ (1− p)pG(θ
D)
1− p+ pG(θD)(1− q
2)(µ− E[θ|θ ≤ θD])
− (1− p)pG(θ
D)
1− p+ pG(θD)
(
1− q
2
q + (1− q)G(θD)
)(
µ− E[θ|θ ≤ θD])
∝ (1− q2)−
(
1− q
2
q + (1− q)G(θD)
)
∝ 1− (q + (1− q)G(θD)) > 0.
It follows that a firm observing θD is better off withholding its information, i.e, θE−θD >
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0. The comparative statics, ∂
∂q
(θE − θD) = ∂
∂q
θE > 0, follows from Proposition 4. 
Proof of Corollary 7: Follows immediately from the discussion in the main text. 
Proof of Corollary 8: Recall that the threshold θE satisfies NE(θE) = 0, and the
threshold θL satisfies NL(θL) = 0. Recall that both NE(·) and NL(·) are monotonically
decreasing in the threshold. To show that θE < θL it is enough to show that n(β) ≡
NE(θ̂)−NL(θ̂) < 0. We note that n(β) is decreasing in β and limβ→0 n(β) > 0, while
limβ→µ n(β) < 0. Hence, there exists βdelay ∈ (0, µ), such that θE > θL if and only if
β < βdelay. 
Proof of Corollary 9: The comparison between P4(f, v) and P3(f) is straightforward.
Here, we only compare P4(f, ∅) with P3(f). Recall that, P3(f) = qf + (1 − q)µ and
P4(f, ∅) = θL. Applying the Envelope Theorem, ddf θL = 1−p1−p+pG(θL) · q + pG(θ
L)
1−p+pG(θL) ·
q
q+(1−q)G(θL > q =
d
df
P3(f). We note that P3(f = f) = qf + (1 − q)µ > f = θL(f =
f) = P4(f = f, ∅), because f < µ. Hence, we have P3(f) > P4(f, ∅) for any f ≥ f . It
remains to show that this inequality holds for f < f . We note that
min
f
P4(f, ∅) = P3(f = 0, ∅)
=
(1− p)(1− q)µ+ pG(θL(f = 0))
(
1− q
q+(1−q)G(θL(f=0))
)
E[θ|θ ≤ θL]
1− p+ pG(θL(f = 0))
<
(1− p)(1− q)µ+ pG(θL(f = 0)) (1− q)E[θ|θ ≤ θL]
1− p+ pG(θL(f = 0))
< (1− q)µ = P3(f = 0) = min
f
P3(f).
Therefore, P4(f, ∅) < P3(f) for any f . 
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